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1. Introduction 
 
According to Ng, Smith and Smith (1999, p.1109) trade credit “is 
created whenever a supplier offers terms that allow the buyer to delay 
payment.” Trade credit, although it is costly, is a very common used form of 
financing in interfirm trade. Lee and Stowe (1993) argue that  trade credit 
outstanding exceeds the volume of corporate bonds, state and local 
securities and by far exceeds the business lending of the entire banking 
system (Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1986). Surveys by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) provide evidence that trade credit is 
the single most important source of short-term business credit despite its 
high costs from unfavorable credit terms for debtors. Elliehausen and 
Wolken (1993) show that 87 % of US firms participating in the National 
Survey of Small Business Finances offer trade credit and that 91 to 100 % 
of these firms‟ sales are on credit. For the UK, Wilson and Summers (2002) 
report that more than 80 % of commercial transactions are on credit terms. 
However, financing via trade credit through suppliers is an area that 
is not been studied in depth in corporate finance literature despite its 
importance. Financial distress and bankruptcy have recently gained much 
attention in academic and public policy debates but investigations in the 
effect of financial distress on trade credit are still in its infancy. Since the 
first comprehensive examination by Petersen and Rajan (1997) several 
hypotheses of trade credit have been developed. The theories try to answer 
why supplier firms act as financial intermediaries, a business that usually is 
done by banks. 
The objective of this work is to give an overview of trade credit 
theories and policies and consequently to test the hypothesis that the use of 
trade credit in the extreme situation of financial distress at firm level is 
significantly different from its use in more “normal” situations. One task of 
this work is to compare the results of European firms with the results of 
Preve (2004) whose work examines US firms. Following the line of Preve 
(2004) in this paper a big panel of European Monetary Union firms is used 
2 
to answer the following research question: “What is the effect of financial 
distress at firm level on trade credit using a big panel of European Monetary 
Union firms?” Related to this issue further questions like the substitution 
effect and the effect of firm size are to be examined and tested. The 
empirical findings of this work are compared with findings in the literature 
respectively with trade credit theories. Finally, possible reasons for different 
findings between US and European firms are to be discussed in brief. 
The work of Preve (2004) is motivated by the fact that the costs from 
the different use of trade credit during distressed periods induces an increase 
of the costs of financial distress and these costs are an important 
determinant of a firm‟s capital structure. Similar to Preve (2004) it is 
assumed in the empirical part that the firms‟ alternative sources of finance 
are restricted or even non-existent. This diploma thesis is motivated to show 
if there are differences in the findings, where are the differences, where do 
they come from and what does this mean for the relevancy of trade credit 
especially for European firms in financial distress.  
This work will be presented in six parts. Next, in section 2 aspects 
and theories of trade credit, i.e. trade credit policies and explanations why 
firms use and grant trade credit, are covered. Particular theories and benefits 
as well as costs of trade credit are discussed. Further the context of trade 
credit and capital structure are addressed and a literature review of trade 
credit and financial distress at firm level are given. 
After having covered aspects and theories of trade credit in section 2, 
section 3 presents arguments for the choice of the data in the empirical part 
of section 4 and 5. Additionally, descriptive statistics are presented and first 
conclusions and comparisons are drawn. The data is an 11 year panel from 
1997 to 2007 of the “Datastream Europe EM Index”. The index contains 
1360 firms of the European Monetary Union and after excluding firms by 
criterias explained in section 3 remain 905 firms in the sample. 
Section 4 gives some insights about the methodology used and 
includes the empirical analysis of the basic model examining the effect of 
financial distress on trade credit and the substitution effect. The latter tests if 
3 
other sources of financing as trade credit like financial debt and equity 
provide financing when European firms are in financial distress. Hereby, 
following the lines of Preve (2004) a standard panel data analysis of 
company accounts data is used. The results of the European panel data are to 
be compared and discussed with those of the US of Preve (2004). Further, 
the sample is tested for consistency with trade credit theories. Additionally 
the trade credit behavior of French firms from the sample is tested. 
Section 5 is an extension of the basic model and in particular 
investigates the importance of firm size to the effect of financial distress on 
trade credit and to the substitution effect. 
Finally, in section 6, some comprehensive remarks, a short summary 
of the main results, a conclusion as well as an outlook are covered. 
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2. Aspects of trade credit 
 
In this section aspects of trade credit, a review of trade credit 
theories as well as at some insights into the financial distress literature are 
given. It includes trade credit policies and theories as explanations why 
firms use and grant trade credit. Furthermore costs of trade credit and 
financial distress as well as capital structure aspects are covered. 
2.1 Trade credit policies  
 
The asset trade credit or receivables is tied directly to the lifeblood 
of any firm, namely cash. Trade credit can be interpreted as a form of credit 
that is granted by a seller firm to finance another firm‟s purchase of the 
seller‟s goods. Sales on credit imply the application of credit terms 
according to a firm‟s credit policy. The trade credit policy of a firm is a 
trade-off between stimulating demand by permissive terms and limiting 
sales by restrictive terms. In case of too restrictive firm‟s policy sales will 
decrease and in case of too permissive conditions it will face increasing 
uncollectible accounts. According to Mateut (2005) trade credit terms or 
policies refer to the timing of payments, the discount for early settlement, 
the method of payment, the ownership prior to payment, and the interest rate 
or penalty for late payment. Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) showed that in the 
market there is a rich variation in credit terms across firms and credit 
policies across industries. Figure 1 gives a nice overview over possible 
credit arrangements. 
5 
 
Figure 1: Time profile of payments and functional activities implied by 
payment policy
1
  
 
The seller can impose payment before delivery or on delivery where 
the buyer assumes the product quality risk and must arrange for financing, 
for example by a bank. For payment after delivery, terms can be net, for 
example “net 30” or two-part, for example “2/10 net 30”. In arrangements 
with payment after delivery the supplier gives financing to a customer and 
the seller bears the credit risk and receivables financing responsibilities. Net 
terms imply that full payment has to be done within a certain period, for 
example “net 30” means full payment due 30 days after the invoice date. 
Invoicing is normally around the date of delivery or at the end of a billing 
cycle. After this period the buyer is in default and will normally receive a 
reminder and/or can be charged interests of delay, a judicial dunning 
procedure may follow. Two-part terms, the second form of trade credit with 
payment after delivery provides a discount if payment is made promptly. It 
has three elements: (1) the discount percentage; (2) the discount period; and 
(3) the net period. According to Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) “2/10 net 30” 
is the most common two-part term. This means 2 % discount for payment 
                                                 
1
 Ng, Smith and Smith (1999). 
6 
within 10 days and a net period of 30 days. The customer gets effectively an 
interest-free loan until the tenth day. After the net period the buyer is in 
default. Not paying within the discount period, i.e. the 10 days, but paying 
on day 30 is effectively a borrowing of 20 days that implies an implicit 
interest rate of 43.9 % which is the opportunity cost for a buyer that forgoes 
the discount in exchange for 20 additional days of financing. The implicit 
interest rate can be calculated this way: 
2
 
Applying this formula on frequently used two-part payment terms, the 
implicit interest rates are: 
 
1/10 net 30  19.8% 2/10 net 30  43.9% 2/20 net 30  106.9% 
4/10 net 30  108.5% 8/30 net 50  349%  
 
Figure 2: Two-part terms and implicit interest rate of foregone 
discount
3
 
 
The above calculations show that trade credit respectively the disuse 
of a discount is very expensive. Therefore creditworthy customers will pay 
early or net because they try to avoid unfavorable credit terms. On the other 
side low-quality borrowers will find it worthwhile to borrow because trade 
credit may still be cheaper than other sources of financing. The following 
Figure 3 shows a broad range of credit periods between European Union 
countries. 
 
Figure 3: Trade credit in European Union countries
4
 
                                                 
2
 Ng, Smith and Smith (1999). 
3
 The calculation uses 360 days as the basis. 
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It points out that the Netherlands and Germany have quite short trade 
credit periods from 25 to 60 days whereas Italy has extensive large credit 
periods up to 120 days. This implies that firms from Italy are expected to 
pay late and, in turn late payment induces costs on the supplier side and may 
reduce its liquidity. Furthermore firms frequently pay beyond the net-period 
with average delays from 11 to 17 days. However, Ng, Smith and Smith 
(1999) found that terms tend to be uniform across an industry and stable 
over time but have a wide variation across industries.
5
  Schwartz (1974) 
states that the formulation of credit terms can be an integral part of the 
seller‟s pricing policy. Varying prices by applying different credit policies 
may reduce a suppliers risk and furthermore allows price discrimination of 
dependent buyers or less wealthy customers.
6
 
2.2 Costs of trade credit and financial distress 
 
According to the pecking order theory should firms prefer internal 
financing over bank financing and equity is seen as last resort if external 
finance is needed. However, Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995, 1997) show 
that firms take trade credit when cheaper sources of financing have been 
exhausted. Even so, for example Elliehausen and Wolken (1993), 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), Willson and Summers (2002) and 
Burkart, Ellingsen and Gianetti (2004) show that lenders use the expensive 
trade credit very often as short-term and medium-term financing. Frequently 
firms do this even if they face no financial problems and although they have 
access to alternative sources of finance that are higher according to the 
pecking order. Note that small firms, start-up firms, fast growing firms and 
firms with less and exhausted access to bank financing tend to use relatively 
more trade credit. In this work it is focused on firm characteristics like a 
firm‟s financial health, market power, size and age to determine the use of 
                                                                                                                            
4
 Mateut  (2005) quoted from Marotta (2001) and Marotta quoted from Dan & Bradstreet 
(2000). (I have no access to D&B (2000).) 
5
 See also Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Smith (1987). 
6
 See Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988) and Pike et. al (2005). 
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trade credit rather than on determinants like the development of a country‟s 
banking system, a country‟s legal system and a country‟s financial policy 
among the most important ones. 
Whenever a trade debtor suffers severe financial problems the 
supplier firm bears the risk of default and the risk of a total loss whenever 
the trade debtor goes bankrupt. Hence, suppliers need a pre-emptive credit 
risk management with permanent monitoring of borrowers including their 
credit ratings. This is necessary due to the fact that firms facing defaults of 
other firms are themselves more likely to default. In other words suppliers 
bear costs of financial distress as an indirect cost, i.e. from the bankruptcy of 
a buyer or late payment. According to a survey by Weiß et al. (2006), 
German firms generate on average 37 % of their sales volume with their 10 
biggest customers. This highlights the risks firms face from a possible single 
default of payment and the importance of precautionary actions to prevent 
cash losses. According to Peter Davies, commercial director of the credit 
insurer Atradius, in 2003 over 15,000 UK businesses failed whereas the 
majority have been small companies with cash flow problems caused by late 
and non-payment. Especially for smaller businesses, the impact of a bad 
debt loss can be devastating. Hence, credit insurance helps to safeguard a 
company‟s future.7 Additionally, factoring may protect from defaults of 
debtors, or if market power permits it, a supplier can instruct payment in 
advance. However, generally whenever suppliers begin to demand cash on 
delivery, there is a lot of speculation whether the buying firm is close to 
bankruptcy. In short terms it is an important signal of creditworthiness that 
firms are allowed to delay its payments. 
Frank and Maksimovic (2005) argue that firms whose prospects start 
to deteriorate often respond by increasing the extent to which they offer 
trade credit to buyers. By doing so suppliers try to hide its financial 
problems. Commercial credit agencies and firm‟s internal credit and 
receivables management are therefore important instruments that can 
                                                 
7
 http://aon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=438 [23.12.2008] 
9 
provide information about the creditworthiness of trading partners.
8
,
 9
 In 
order to reduce a supplier‟s risk and costs, credit agencies, credit insurances 
and adequate payment terms reduce information asymmetries and may 
improve a supplier‟s liquidity. To show the devastating impact of a bad debt 
loss a simple calculation is presented. 
For example, taking a fictitious bad debt loss of Euro 10,000 and a 
fictitious profit margin of 5 %: 5 % of 10,000 equals a profit of Euro 500. In 
this case a business must generate 200,000 Euro in additional sales to regain 
a loss of 10,000 Euro. It implies 20 times the lost sales volume. This 
example still excludes the time value of money, namely the opportunity 
costs of the not gained money as well as the interests for a bank loan or 
account overdraft in case of low liquidity of the supplier company. An 
account that must be written off due to failure involves not only the 
inventory and profit lost, but also additional costs such as legal fees and 
credit professional time. The importance of cash flow is known by the 
dictum “Cash is king”. Companies have to care about credit management 
and payment terms because even huge accounts receivables can bring 
companies short on cash and into bankruptcy if too many customers are in 
default. To prevent cash or bad debt losses a rigorous credit management 
may be useful. This is achieved by either monitoring and screening and, if 
necessary, by adjusting customer‟s credit terms individually. But, as already 
mentioned, it implies a trade-off between stimulating and limiting sales. 
Hence, to regain the loss of a bad debt a firm needs a huge additional sales 
volume and the prevention of it should have high priority. 
 
                                                 
8
 Commercial agencies that pool and sell credit information are for example Dun and 
Bradstreet, KSV, Creditreform and CEG Creditreform. 
9
 Networks for Credit Managers are for example the “Verein für Credit Management” 
(VfCM) and the “Federation of European Credit Management Associations” (FECMA). 
They have the vision to establish „best practices“ for the credit management. The VfCM 
supports the “Mindestanforderungen an das Creditmanagement” (MaCM), a kind of codex 
or guideline to protect suppliers from default of payment. MaCM for corporations is an 
effort to establish standards like the “Mindestanforderungen an das Kreditgeschäft” for 
banks (MaK). 
10 
2.3 Trade credit and capital structure 
 
According to Preve (2004) the costs of trade credit during financial 
distress increase, hence these costs are an important factor of a firm‟s capital 
structure. Further he argues that trade credit is very expensive implying that 
the cost of financial distress may be higher.
10
 Previously Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) have shown the importance of trade credit in a firm‟s capital 
structure. They present evidence that 15 % of the total liabilities of US firms 
in 1991 consists of accounts payable. German balance sheets show 11.5 %, 
French 17 %, Italian 14.7 % and those of the UK 13.7 %. Whereas the ratio 
of accounts receivables to total assets amounts 17.8 % in the US, 26.9 % in 
Germany, 28.9 % in France, 29 % in Italy and 22.1 % in the UK. In order to 
understand firm‟s capital structure choice in relation to trade credit the 
Modigliani Miller Theorem and the pecking order theory will be explained 
briefly. In the literature there was a debate on whether firms target a certain 
capital structure (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995) or follow a pecking order 
(see Myers, 1984 and Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999) when raising funds.  
Next, the capital structure choice. According to the trade-off theory 
of capital structure firms should choose a debt ratio that maximizes the firm 
value. Furthermore, firms that target a certain capital structure face a trade-
off between tax benefits and the costs of financial distress from bad debt. 
The choice between bank debt and trade credit implies that entrepreneur‟s 
trade-off the cheaper bank debt against the cost induced by a strict bank 
liquidation policy. According to Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006), firms 
with safe, tangible assets and plenty of taxable income ought to have high 
debt targets but unprofitable companies with risky and intangible assets tend 
to rely primarily on equity financing. The capital structure theory explains 
many industry differences in capital structure, but it does not explain why 
most profitable firms within an industry generally are likely having the most 
conservative capital structures. 
                                                 
10
 See also Altman (1984), Opler and Titman (1994) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998). 
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This can be better explained by the pecking-order theory that 
grounds on the theory of asymmetric information between managers and 
outside investors because managers know more about the prospects and 
risks of their company. Therefore managers avoid issuing stock when they 
believe the share price is too low but try to issue in fairly and overpriced 
times (equity financing). Further, optimistic managers will prefer debt to 
undervalued equity and pessimistic managers will be forced to do the same. 
As a consequence investors often interpret the issue of new share as bad 
news resulting in falling stock prices after the announcement. This shows 
that in an imperfect world firms have preferences in the order of the source 
of finance. More precisely, if internal sources based on retained earnings or 
cash flow are available they are ranked above external sources like trade 
credit, bank borrowing and non-bank finance. Further, the fact that less 
profitable firms in an industry on overall borrow more can be explained by 
the pecking order theory. Firms where internal funds are exhausted and 
where financial distress threatens their business activity will choose 
consequently debt and equity as last resort in the pecking order. Hence, 
financially distressed firms are expected to use more trade credit. 
Next, the theorems of Modigliani and Miller.  Modigliani and Miller 
(henceforth MM) (1958) state that in perfect capital markets without tax 
capital structure (the ratio of debt to equity) has no impact on either the firm 
value or the cost of capital.
11
 The MM proposition holds as long as the total 
cash flow generated by the firms‟ assets is unchanged by its capital structure 
respectively as long as the capital structure choice does not affect a firm‟s 
investment, borrowing and operating policies. MM‟s Proposition 1 says also 
that the choice between long-term and short-term debt has no effect on firm 
value. Thus, the distinction between bank financing and financing by 
suppliers via trade credit should be irrelevant.
12
 
 
                                                 
11
 Further assumptions are: no transaction costs and no dependence between the net 
operating earnings and the capital structure of the firm. 
12
 See Mizen and Yalcin (2006) and Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006). 
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Figure 4: MM world
13
 
 
As depicted in Figure 4, in a MM world (Proposition 2) the 
substitution of the more expensive equity by the less expensive debt results 
in an increase in the cost of equity (ke), leaving the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) constant. Note that the WACC is the expected rate of 
return on the market value of all of the firm‟s securities. The WACC is also 
called overall cost of capital or a company‟s cost of capital. Note also that 
the debt value not the debt ratio stays constant with rising leverage. The 
costs of equity increase linearly as long as debt is risk free (see Figure 4). 
However, rising leverage increases the risk and according to MM‟s 
proposition 2 debtholders will demand a higher return on debt. Thus, costs 
of debt will rise and the increase in the cost of equity will slow down.
14
 
 
Figure 5: MM world with corporate tax
15
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 Wu (2007). 
14
 Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006). 
15
 Wu (2007). 
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Figure 5 shows the real world situation with both, tax and market 
imperfections. According to Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006), debt provides 
a corporate interest tax shield and may spur managers to work harder. 
However, the use of debt has also its drawbacks because it may lead to 
costly financial distress. In practice there also exist potential conflicts of 
interest between security holders and information problems that favor debt 
over equity. Thus capital structure and trade credit affect a firms cost of 
capital and the value of a firm. Hence, even though trade credit may 
improve a firm‟s capital structure it may also increase its costs. 
Miller (1977) concludes that the use of liabilities reduces the cost of 
capital to the corporation. But in fact in the real world firms cannot obtain as 
much financing from debt as they want. Additionally, with higher leverage 
the interest rate on debt will rise because of the rising possibility of 
bankruptcy. Rising interest rates on the other side reduce a firm‟s 
profitability. For example 100 % debt financing would definitely force a 
firm into bankruptcy and its interest rate on debt would rise to infinite. This 
means that trade credit can contribute to reduce a firm‟s cost of capital until 
a certain amount. This proposal holds only if the marginal corporate tax rate 
is lower than the implicit interest rate of trade credit which is frequently not 
the case because implicit interest rates range from about 20 % to 350 % and 
marginal corporate tax rates are normally not higher than 50 %. The 
discussion of MM and the pecking-order theory has shown that trade credit 
is an important determinant of capital structure. 
2.4 Benefits and theories of trade credit  
 
Why firms rely on trade credit, what are the benefits for both, sellers 
and buyers? Why act supplier firms as financial intermediaries although 
they are not specialized in it? And, last but not least, why do they act like 
banks and provide working capital or short-term finance to its buyers? The 
next section sheds light on some of these questions by highlighting the main 
benefits. With respect to the main theories of trade credit the main aspects, 
similarities and opposing positions will be discussed and reviewed. 
14 
Trade credit financing has several advantages. Meltzer (1960) 
discusses the incidence of changing monetary policy on individual business‟ 
mercantile credit. He shows when money tightens firms with large cash 
balances increase the average length of time they grant credit. Note that 
during tight monetary policy money or loans are more difficult to obtain in a 
given country. The early literature argues that trade credit is extended by 
unsophisticated market participants to secure sales. Bierman and Hausman 
(1970) present credit granting models to find a trade-off between restrictive 
and permissive credit granting. These models quantify the expected value of 
future credit extension opportunities. Schwartz (1974) found that firms with 
better access to capital have an incentive to offer financing to clients without 
alternative sources of finance. Lee and Stowe (1993) present a model where 
there is a separating equilibrium in which the size of the cash discount (the 
trade credit policy) conveys information about product quality. The driving 
forces of their equilibrium are risk-sharing motives of the supplier and buyer 
as well as asymmetric information about product quality. 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) are the first presenting evidence why 
firms extend trade credit and which firms are the largest providers and users 
of trade credit. They found that the decision to take advantage of early 
payment discount is driven not by the implicit cost of trade credit but by 
whether the firm has an alternative source of finance like bank credit. The 
latter and former literature suggest that firms use more trade credit when 
they are unable to obtain funds from the financial sector. One theory is 
about the provision of finance to firms with less credit availability by more 
profitable firms via interest rate arbitrage. For theories with different credit 
availability see Biais and Gollier (1997), Smith (1987) and Emery (1984). 
Due to the leverage effect bank credit is frequently taken by profitable 
firms. These firms then provide financing to firms without alternative 
sources of financing via trade credit. However, Frank and Maksimovic 
(2005) note that this form of financing is not efficient. 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) argue that it appears that suppliers have 
an advantage in financing growing firms, especially when their credit 
15 
quality is opaque. They conjecture three potential reasons: (1) Firms may be 
a source of future business; (2) Firms may obtain information from product 
market transactions at fewer costs from market transactions and (3) 
Suppliers appear to rely on their ability to repossess goods and to sell them 
again. They further argue that suppliers may be better than specialized 
financial institutions in evaluating and controlling the credit risk of their 
customers, that suppliers may have an advantage over financial institutions 
in monitoring and that they may get hard and soft facts at lower costs and 
also faster from product market transactions and other suppliers. 
Theories with superior information of suppliers over financial 
institutions are provided by Smith (1987), Brennan, Maksimovic and 
Zechner (1988) amongst others. Fact is that banks are normally more 
specialized in the provision of credit. However, a comparative advantage of 
firms over banks is that they know the industry better and that they have 
advantages in obtaining information about a buyer‟s creditworthiness. Preve 
(2004) presents a literature review of trade credit theories where suppliers 
have an advantage over financial institutions in obtaining information about 
a buyers‟ creditworthiness and ensuring repayment.16 
According to Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) trade credit terms offer 
firms contractual solutions to reduce informational asymmetries between 
buyers and sellers. Therefore trade credit terms are important in firms were 
informational asymmetries are high, for these firms the pecking order theory 
applies better than the trade-off theory of capital structure. Because of the 
better information acquisition by suppliers, trade credit users and suppliers 
have advantages when there are adverse selection problems as in Meyers 
and Majluf (1984). 
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) report that moral hazard and cash 
diversion problems may be less important for interfirm relationships than 
for bank-firm relationships. This means that firm to firm relationships may 
have an advantage over bank-firm relationships because of less information 
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 E.g.: Smith (1987), Mian and Smith (1992), Lee and Stowe (1993), Long, Malitz and 
Ravid (1993), Deloof and Jeggers (1996), Biais and Gollier (1997), Emery and Nayar 
(1998), Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) and Frank and Maksimovic (2005). 
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asymmetry or easier monitoring capabilities due to continuous business 
contacts and knowing the industry better. Huyghebaert (2006) argues that 
repeating orders allows suppliers to collect more timely information on 
customer‟s creditworthiness. Suppliers may visit the buyer‟s premises more 
often and the time and size of the buyer‟s orders give them an idea of the 
creditworthiness. If a buyer does not take advantage of early payment 
discounts, it can be an indicator for the deterioration of a buyer‟s 
creditworthiness. By monitoring repayment, suppliers get a quick read on a 
firm‟s financial and economic health (Smith, 1987). 
Other researchers concentrated on the aspect of transaction costs, for 
example Ferris (1981) and Petersen and Rajan (1997). Ferris (1981) argues 
that trade credit may reduce the transaction costs of paying bills. Instead of 
paying bills with every delivered good, bills are frequently paid 
cumulatively, i.e. monthly or quarterly. Another example is when sales vary 
seasonally but production stays constant over the year and hence warehouse 
costs and costs for financing arise. Further, Petersen and Rajan (1997) argue 
that by offering trade credit selectively across customers and over time, the 
firm may be able to manage its inventory position better. Bougheas, Mateut 
and Mizen (2009) present a model concerning the trade-off between the 
costs of holding inventories and obtaining future cash by granting trade 
credit. Their theoretical model provides predictions to the response of 
accounts payable and accounts receivable to changes in inventories, 
profitability, risk and liquidity. Furthermore, they check their predictions by 
testing them on a panel of UK firms. They find that accounts payable and 
accounts receivable respond less to inventories in large firms than they do in 
small firms.
17
 An interpretation of this is that large firms are less influenced 
by the trade-off of current credit sales and future cash sales because their 
holding costs are lower. 
Another important theory of trade credit is the theory of price 
discrimination as analyzed by Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1998). A 
common argument for price discrimination is the suppliers‟ possibility to set 
                                                 
17
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firms in that particular industry and year. The remainder are small firms. 
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unfavorable trade credit payment terms to risky customers. By law it is 
forbidden to offer goods at different prices but firms can price discriminate 
by offering different credit terms. According to Brennan, Maksimovic and 
Zechner (1988) permits it a firm to lower its price to firms whose goods are 
sensitive to changes in price.
18
 Petersen and Rajan (1997) assume that credit 
terms are usually invariant or independent set to the credit quality of the 
buyer. Since trade credit exposes a supplier to default risk, the effective 
price of the credit is lower for low-quality borrowers and allows risky 
borrowers to extend its demand. If a risky buyer‟s demand is more elastic in 
the short run, the supplier can stimulate sales. Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
found that the higher the profit margin the more likely the supplier offers 
credit because of higher levels of accounts receivable of them. They also 
argue that low quality borrowers are the most price elastic in the short run. 
A negative result is presented by Burkart and Ellingsen (2004). They state 
that the price discrimination theory has a shortcoming because the theory 
cannot account for trade credit in competitive markets. Their theory of 
monitoring advantage of suppliers applies only on input transactions. They 
argue that bank credit and trade credit can be either complements or 
substitutes. They are complements for firms whose aggregate debt capacity 
constrains investment and they are substitutes for firms with sufficient 
aggregate debt capacity. 
Next, note that a buyer may obtain his goods only from a very 
limited number of suppliers. If so, this gives the supplier the potential to cut 
off future supplies when the borrower takes actions that reduce the chances 
of repayment, especially when the buyer accounts only for a small portion 
of the suppliers sales. This argument of Petersen and Rajan (1997) is only 
valid, if a supplier has numerous buyers and if she is not dependent from 
sales with one or a few buyers. In this case she cannot threat to cut future 
supplies that easily. Actually a supplier may has to grant permissive credit 
terms to generate enough cash to survive or actually has to accept late 
payment with taking discount anyway. 
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A sub-theory of price discrimination and informational advantage is 
the theory of “implicit equity financing” in a repeated relationship. Implicit 
equity financing in customers is a non-salvageable investment that has the 
potential of adverse selection and the character of an option. It offers the 
supplier a high potential for future business from firms with high sales 
growth but with suspect credit quality (current losses). A possible 
consequence could be that it may destroy firm value in the short run but 
expected future cash flow and long term firm value will be high. Petersen 
and Rajan (1997) state that “... the supplier has an implicit equity stake in 
the firm equal to the present value of the margins he makes on current and 
future sales of the product to the firm.“ Bierman and Hausman (1970) state 
that if credit is not granted then a firm may not only lose today‟s sales but 
may also lose future sales. Hence, providing short-term financing and 
therefore supporting the survival and growing, especially of new and 
relatively more elastic customers is in the long-term interest of a supplier 
because of potential future business with it.  
Other arguments for implicit equity financing are for example that 
the provision of finance to suppliers may be more profitable especially in an 
economic boom when they need more liquidity to expand and when one 
firm is highly dependent on the other. Wilner (2000) states that firms with 
high profit margins have a strong incentive in equity financing because by 
this they will make additional sales. They can cut prices for new possible 
customers as long as their profit on the next unit is higher than the cost to 
sell an additional unit at a lower price. However, they are recommended to 
do this no longer as it does not affect previous sales. 
Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) state that a supplier‟s stake in a 
relationship may far exceed the implicit equity stake of a financial 
institution because of the potential for a continuous repeated business 
relationship. Despite the risk of default of payment or even of a total loss 
suppliers have advantages in liquidating collateral or certain types of 
inventories as perceived by Longhofer and Santos (2003). Wilner (2000) 
and Cuñat (2007) among the most important ones explain that suppliers and 
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their customers may have a common interest in mutual survival, that they 
have an interest in maintaining long-term relationships with their customers 
and that they have an implicit equity stake in the buyer due to shared rents 
from ongoing business relationships. Furthermore they argue that trade 
creditors that depend on their customer‟s business grant more credit to 
financially distressed firms than banks in order to maintain their 
relationship. 
Other benefits of trade credit are that the credit period permits the 
buyer to check the product quality before payment and to reduce a sellers‟ 
uncertainty concerning a buyers‟ payment intentions. Signaling aspects are 
on further aspect that comes to mind when covering trade credit theories. 
Wilson and Summers (2002) argue that trade credit is a signaling of 
reputation and financial health. Lee and Stowe (1993) interpret trade credit 
as an implicit warranty guaranteeing product quality.
19
 Note that the buyer 
normally has a net period over which to test the product to determine 
whether the product or the delivered goods are of satisfactory quality before 
making payment. A seller can signal good product quality by offering two-
part terms in order to give the buyer more time to check the product. So if a 
good does not fulfill a buyer‟s expectations, she can refuse payment and 
return the good. However, once the buyer pays, normally she can only get 
refund or seek legal relief for unsatisfactory merchandise. Hence, 
redemption may be costly and difficult. This means that a buyer that pays 
early and takes the discount bears the product risk. Further, Lee and Stowe 
(1993) interpret the difference between the credit and cash price as the price 
of warranty attached to the product. In order to guarantee product quality 
sellers may choose either trade credit or legal product warranty. At this 
point may appear the question why sellers use trade credit rather than 
product warranty to signal product quality? By giving trade credit in 
addition to the (legal) warranty the supplier reduces the buyer‟s product risk. 
For some products like drugs it is difficult for the buyer to prove if the 
delivered products quality is lower than the promised. When the buyer has 
                                                 
19
 For signaling aspects in the context of product quality see also Smith (1987), Long et al. 
(1993) and Pike et al. (2005). 
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the option to refuse payment and when the delivered product does not fulfill 
the buyer‟s expectations than trade credit may be seen as the strongest form 
of product warranty. Furthermore, sellers with no reputation or history have 
frequently no established relationships. These normally small or young 
firms may have difficulties in selling products with a regular warranty 
because they are less honored due to of the risk of bankruptcy. For example 
Long et al. (1993) found that firms extend more credit when the company 
size is smaller and produce goods that require a relatively long time to 
assess quality. Buyer and seller reputation are therefore determinants of a 
firm‟s choice to extend trade credit. Consequently, the better known the 
product quality is, especially when asymmetric information is low, and the 
more confidence in the buyer, the more two-part terms will be used. 
Furthermore, trade credit permits suppliers to reduce the doubt of a 
prospective buyer whether the supplier goes bankrupt and consequently 
losing the regular warranty claim. 
If a buyer defaults, the supplier can seize the supplied goods. This 
argument may be limited by bankruptcy laws. Mian and Smith (1992) and 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) argue that the more durable goods are and the 
less they are transformed the better collaterals they are. Better collaterals 
positively correlate with the amount of credit the supplier is able to grant. 
Financial institutions may also reclaim assets to pay off the loan but 
suppliers costs of repossessing and reselling will be lower if the supplier has 
a network for selling its goods. Biais and Gollier (1997), Burkart and 
Ellingsen (2004) and Frank and Maksimovic (2005) argue that suppliers 
have a comparative advantage in liquidating inventories and better 
enforcement capabilities. Note that Fisman and Love (2003) found that 
accounts payable and inventory holdings are positively related. An 
interpretation of this is that firms that hold large amounts of raw material 
inventories are better able to obtain trade credit financing when necessary. 
The efficiency enhancing aspect of trade credit and trade credit as a 
part of an optimal selling policy are discussed by Burkart and Ellingsen 
(2004) and Arya et al. (2006). Former develop another theory of trade 
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credit. While earlier theories concentrate on monitoring advantages of 
suppliers, the new aspect in their theory is that it exclusively applies to input 
transactions. They argue that inputs are less easily diverted than cash and 
that inputs are more easily observed by suppliers and therefore are less 
subject to moral hazard. Since monitoring costs are therefore lower for 
suppliers, trade credit can enhance efficiency. A further interesting aspect 
provided by them is that firms offer trade credit despite the necessity to take 
bank credit and/or trade credit to finance their operations. They claim that 
firms simultaneously provide and use trade credit because receivables can 
be collateralized. When an invoice is pledged as collateral, it becomes 
illiquid from the firm‟s perspective and the firm can obtain additional 
finance from banks against the receivables. Hence, an additional Euro 
offered in trade credit does not really force a firm to reduce its real 
investment by the same amount. Burkart and Ellingsen aim to proof their 
predictions empirically in the future. 
Arya (2006) shows that offering trade credit is able to enhance the 
efficiency of incentive contracts with sales personnel. A credit sale gives the 
client a second possibility to generate enough cash and this, in turn, gives 
the sales agent another opportunity to demonstrate his past diligence to the 
firm. 
Preve (2004) sheds light on the relationship between corporate 
financial distress and trade credit. He finds that financially distressed firms 
receive more trade credit from their suppliers. This is consistent with the 
predictions of Frank and Maksimovic (2005). It seems that trade credit 
usage increases during periods of financial distress and that financially 
distressed firms extend less trade credit to their buyers. The last finding 
contradicts the argument of Frank and Maksimovic (2005) who argue that 
firms whose prospects start to deteriorate try to boost their sales by 
increasing the grant of trade credit. The distinction may be in the timeline 
respectively the period short before entering into financial distress and the 
period of entering and staying in it. When firms note that they will enter into 
financial distress soon, they try a rebound by stimulating sales by granting 
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more trade credit. When they are in financial distress they may try to sell 
relatively less on credit to generate enough liquidity to survive. A counter-
argument is that financially distressed firms with low market power may be 
forced to sell on credit in order to attract more customers. Huyghebaert 
(2006) argues that compared to banks, suppliers are relatively lenient 
towards firms in financial distress which is treasured especially by 
entrepreneurs who highly value control rights. Molina and Preve (2009) 
study the receivables policy of distressed firms as a trade-off between a 
firm‟s willingness to gain sales and the firm‟s need for cash and estimate 
costs of financial distress. 
Another important advantage of trade credit is that suppliers provide 
to its buyers liquidity and allows them to increase their leverage which in 
turn may reduce its tax payment. Note that its use implies a trade-off 
between tax advantages and costs of financial distress resulting from 
possible bad debts.
20
 
In summary in this section we have seen that trade credit policy 
might reduce information asymmetry and conveys information about 
product quality. Furthermore trade credit allows to price discriminate and 
improves a buyer‟s working capital, which is one important advantage of 
trade credit. 
2.5 Financial crisis at firm level 
 
After having covered the main advantages of trade credit this section 
concentrates on literature that focuses on the case where firms are distressed 
or have financial problems. This stream of literature is related to the fact that 
financial distress may influence the use and grant of trade credit and this in 
turn may influence its liquidity and creditworthiness and hence may move a 
firm into financial distress. 
Financial distress at firm level means that firms face problems to 
generate enough money to pay off their liabilities. According to Brealey, 
Myers and Allen (2006) financial distress occurs when promises to creditors 
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are broken or honored with difficulty. This can force a firm into bankruptcy 
or close to bankruptcy. According to Huyghebaert (2006) financial distress 
or financial constraints are a major reason for using trade credit. For 
example Petersen and Rajan (1997) show that bank credit constrained firms 
tend to rely more on trade credit. In addition they note that managers in 
distressed firms tend to keep up sales with respect to low credit quality 
customers in order to maintain business with them. Another explanation 
provided by them is that financial distressed firms try to signal financial 
strength like strong firms. Strong firms offer credit and weak firms try to 
imitate them. This means that suppliers are forced to extend relatively more 
trade credit which causes potential costs of financial distress. 
Gianmarino (1989) and Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) showed the 
importance of the costs of financial distress. These costs were measured by 
Altman (1984), Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and Opler and Titman (1994).
21
 
The pioneer work by Altman (1984) measures the costs of financial distress, 
the indirect costs of bankruptcy. He measures the loss of market share and 
unexpected losses of profits for firms that later went bankrupt. Later Opler 
and Titman (1994) analyze the costs of financial distress. They classify the 
costs of financial distress in three categories: (1) customer driven costs, (2) 
competition driven costs, and (3) managerial driven costs. The first includes 
the loss of sales due to the aversion of customers to buy products of 
distressed firms. The second includes the costs caused by competitors 
attacking the distressed firm‟s position. The last costs are a benefit caused 
by the higher effort from a manager due to the distressed situation of the 
firm. They found that the costs of financial distress driven by lower 
operating profit and loss in market share are positive and significant. 
Andrade and Kaplan (1998) address direct and indirect costs of 
financial distress and note that Altman (1984), who found large indirect cost 
of financial distress, does not distinguish them from negative operating 
shocks. They state that the difficulty to measure the costs of financial 
distress lies in the inability to distinguish whether the poor performance by a 
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firm in financial distress comes from the financial distress itself or by 
factors that brought the firm into financial distress in the first place. 
Andrade and Kaplan (1998) state also that the firms examined by Asquith, 
Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) are not only financial distressed, but also 
economically distressed.
22
 This makes it difficult to identify whether they 
measure costs coming from financial distress, economic distress, or an 
interaction of them. 
The sample of Andrade and Kaplan (1998) consists of highly 
leveraged transactions that become financially, not economically distressed. 
They state that their sample is mainly financially distressed because their 
firms have positive operating margins during distressed periods and 
operating margins that typically exceed the industry median.
23
 This means 
that these firms would appear healthy relative to other firms in the industry 
without their high leverage. They found that the primary cause of distress is 
high leverage, whereas poor firm performance and poor industry 
performance are less important. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) conclude for 
their sample of financially distressed firms that costs of financial distress are 
between 10 and 20 % of total firm value. Interestingly they found no 
evidence that distressed firms engage in any asset substitution. 
Preve (2004) found for a US sample that firms tend to use a 
significantly larger amount of trade credit from suppliers when they are in 
financial distress. Additionally he showed that trade credit acts as a 
substitute for other sources of financing like financial credit and 
shareholder‟s equity. Furthermore, from a cross sectional analysis across 
firms and industries he observes variations in the effect of financial distress 
on trade credit. Notice the following variations. The increase of trade credit 
is mostly in small firms. Retail industries do not increase their level of trade 
credit in financial distress and do not substitute between trade credit and 
financial credit during financial distress. Manufacturing industries use less 
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trade credit than non-manufacturing firms. Finally, financially distressed 
firms whose creditworthiness is more difficult to observe by financial 
institutions tend to substitute financial credit with trade credit. Frank and 
Maksimovic (2005) show that firm‟s whose prospects start to deteriorate, 
frequently respond by increasing the size they offer trade credit. Their 
theory is supported by the empirical findings of Preve (2004). They interpret 
financially distressed firms as low type buyers which are allowed to “stretch 
the payables” whereas high type buyers pay on time. They note that many 
practitioners recommend stretching payments and collecting receivables to 
increase profitability. Jostarndt (2006) investigates corporate responses to 
financial distress. He analyses the impact of distress on corporate 
governance, a firms choices between private workouts and formal 
insolvency procedures as well as the role of claimholder conflicts in 
distressed equity offerings. He argues that the major costs of financial 
distress result from the fact that managers in fear of existence are detained 
from doing business as usual. 
Molina and Preve (2009) study the trade receivables policy of 
distressed firms as the trade off between the firm‟s willingness to gain sales 
and the firm‟s need for cash. They divide financial distress in two stages: 
The pre-financial distress stage, usually with profitability problems, and the 
financial distress stage, usually with cash flow problems. An additional 
outcome is that firms increase trade receivables when they have profitability 
problems but reduce trade receivables when they have cash flow problems. 
They further found that the performance decline of a firm during financial 
distress is significantly higher if the firm cuts receivables than if it does not. 
To conclude, there are various theories of trade credit and we have 
seen that a firm‟s decision to take advantage of early payment discount 
depends frequently on whether it has alternative sources of finance or not. 
The aspects and theories of trade credit show that despite its costs it has 
several advantages as well. Furthermore the literature shows that firms use 
more trade credit when funds from the financial sector are not available. 
Hence, financially distressed firms tend to use more trade credit. 
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The next chapters (Section 3, 4 and 5) provide the empirical part of 
the work and investigate the use of trade credit by distressed European 
firms. Notice that a very similar approach as Preve (2004) is used since he 
studies the effect of the extreme condition of financial distress on trade 
credit for the US. Section 3 covers a data description, explains the variables 
and the estimation strategy. Section 4 includes the methodology, 
hypotheses, the panel data analysis and interpretation of the basic model. 
The sample is tested for whether firms use more trade credit during financial 
distress and for the substitution effect. The last tests if other sources of 
financing as trade credit like long term debt and equity provide financing 
when European firms are in financial distress. Additionally distressed 
French firms of the sample are tested on the use of trade credit and the 
substitution effect. In section 5, the firm size is used as a characteristic to 
measure the effect of financial distress on trade credit as well as the 
substitution effect between trade credit and other sources of financing. In 
Section 4 and 5 comparisons with findings from the literature, especially 
with those of Preve (2004) will be done. The last section (Section 6) 
concludes and empirical implications and suggestions are given by the 
author. 
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3. Sample description, main variables and summary 
statistics 
 
This section motivates the sample, defines the variables and 
consequently summary statistics give a better understanding of a firm‟s 
choice of finance in interaction with financial distress and its variation over 
time. Afterwards chapter 4 and 5 investigate the effect of financial distress 
on trade credit empirically. In general a very similar methodology as the one 
in Preve (2004) is used. Therefore, annual panel data from Datastream from 
1997 to 2007 are selected. The data consists of firms from the “Datastream 
Europe EM Index”, an index containing 1360 companies of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
24
 Companies with the following 
characteristics are eliminated: Those that reported net sales of less than Euro 
1 million, those that do not report positive costs of goods sold, those with 
relevant missing data from the Datastream data retrieval as well as firms 
whose data were retrieved twice.
25
,
 26
 To classify the firms by industry the 
Datastream “Level 3 Sector Name” is used and as is customary in this type 
of research, all companies in the banking, insurance, real estate and financial 
service industry are eliminated.
27
 After this selection process 905 companies 
remain in the sample with a total number of 9,955 observations. 
The selected sample henceforth is called “sample”. The main 
variables used in the diploma thesis are summarized and defined in Table 1. 
Table 2 presents the industry classification identifying each of the industries 
and including some selected summary statistics from the data. Table 3 
presents the firms‟ countries. 
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Table 1: Summary of the Main Variables 
This table summarizes the main variables used in models. 
 
Measures of trade credit 
TCCGS360 trade payables over 
cost of goods sold 
Measures the trade credit (in days) scaled 
by the transaction that generated it 
(Purchases proxied by cost of goods sold).  
TRCA trade payables over 
total assets  
 
Measures what portion of the assets is 
financed by suppliers. 
TCFD trade payables over 
financial debt 
Measures the relation between trade credit 
and financial debt. 
TRCE trade payables over  
equity 
Measures the relation between trade credit 
and equity. 
 
Measures of Distress  
FINDIST  
FINDIST_LAG 
Dummy Var. = 1 if 
the firm is in 
financial distress – (1 
Lag).  Alternative 
measure – 0 lags. 
A firm is in financial distress (FD) if:  
EBITD < Interest Payments for two years 
in a row,   
Or,   
EBITD < (80% * Interest Payments) in any 
year 
FDYS Number of years that 
a company has been 
in financial distress. 
Sum of years in which FINDIST = 1 for a 
given company. 
TIMELINE Identifies at what 
stage of the financial 
distress process the 
company is. 
Zero indicates that the firm entered in 
financial distress in the same year.  Positive 
numbers indicate the years spent in 
financial distress, and negative numbers 
indicate the distance to entering in financial 
distress. 
TROUBLE Dummy variable = 1 
if the firm has 
FINDIST=1 at any 
moment in the 
sample life. 
This variable indicates if the firm enters 
into financial distress at any time during 
the sample time. 
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Variables for Firm and Industry Characteristics 
LARGE_S Auxiliary variable = 1 if a 
single observation shows 
sales higher than the 
median industry sales on a 
yearly basis. 
This variable is a time 
variant auxiliary variable. 
MAX_LARGE_S Dummy variable = 1 if a 
single observation of 
large_s = 1 during sample 
life time. 
Indicates large firms that 
were large at least once. 
Hence, this is a time 
invariant variable. 
PRE_LARGE_S Dummy variable = 1 if a 
firms sales were above the 
yearly median of its 
industry in the pre-
financial distress period 
(during TIMELINE = -1). 
Note that timeline 
automatically covers 
financially distressed 
firms. 
Indicates large firms that 
were large in the pre-
financial distress period 
in a given year. Note that 
PRE_LARGE_S is time 
invariant. 
FINDIST_LAG_PRE_LARGE_S Dummy variable = 1 if 
pre_large_s = 1 and if 
findist_lag = 1 on a yearly 
basis. 
Is an interaction term of 
pre_large_s and 
findist_lag that identifies 
firms that were big in the 
pre-financial distress 
period (at TIMELINE = -
1) and already in 
financial distress the year 
before Timeline = -1. 
Note that this variable is 
time variant. 
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Table 2: Industry Division and Summary Statistics 
This table presents the Datastream “Level 3 Sector Name” industry division along with 
selected summary statistics for the industries. Nobs is the number of observation and 
Nfirms is the number of firms in each industry whereas Freq is the Frequency. FD is the 
number of observations in financial distress and FD % is the percentage of observations in 
financial distress in each industry. TR. is the number of TROUBLE firms and TR. % is the 
percentage of firms in financial distress in each industry. TRCA is the average value of 
Trade Payables on Assets and TCCGS is the average value of Trade Payables on Cost of 
Goods Sold in each industry. 
Ind Industry Name Nobs Nfirms Freq. FD FD % TR. TR. % TRCA TCCGS 
1 Automobiles & Parts 352 32 3.5% 11 3.1% 6 18.8% 0.144 0.212 
2 Basic Resources 418 38 4.2% 20 4.8% 8 21.1% 0.100 0.184 
3 Chemicals 396 36 4.0% 22 5.6% 11 30.6% 0.120 0.169 
4 Construct. & Material 869 79 8.7% 20 2.3% 10 12.7% 0.160 0.185 
5 Food & Beverage 759 69 7.6% 16 2.1% 11 15.9% 0.129 0.215 
6 Healthcare 704 64 7.1% 95 13.5% 22 34.4% 0.090 0.354 
7 Ind. Goods & Services 2,244 204 22.5% 78 3.5% 38 18.6% 0.121 0.224 
8 Media 572 52 5.7% 33 5.8% 17 32.7% 0.132 0.413 
9 Oil & Gas 506 46 5.1% 44 8.7% 12 26.1% 0.122 0.407 
10 
Pers & Househld 
Goods 616 56 6.2% 20 3.2% 11 19.6% 0.136 0.237 
11 Retail 550 50 5.5% 7 1.3% 4 8.0% 0.208 0.162 
12 Technology 748 68 7.5% 99 13.2% 34 50.0% 0.125 0.464 
13 Telecommunications 165 15 1.7% 20 12.1% 8 53.3% 0.090 0.688 
14 Travel & Leisure 451 41 4.5% 32 7.1% 17 41.5% 0.083 0.228 
15 Utilities 605 55 6.1% 13 2.1% 6 10.9% 0.086 1.003 
∑   9,955 905 100% 530 5.3% 215 23.8%     
ø           5.9%   26.3% 0.123 0.343 
 
The firms have a median in sales of Euro 639.80 million and a mean 
of Euro 3,685.24 million.
28
 The median book value of assets is Euro 698.15 
million and the mean Euro 4,841.77 million. Table 2 shows that the 
Industrial Goods and Service Industry represent the biggest industries in the 
sample with 22.5 % whereas for example the retail industry only makes up 
for 5.52 %. 53.3 % of the firms in the Telecommunication sector are at least 
once in financial distress during the sample period. 
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Table 3: Countries 
This table presents the Countries according to the International Security Identification 
Number (ISIN) of the firms respectively the securities of the sample. In other words, for the 
classification the Datastream retrieve “ISIN Issuer Country” is used. Nobs is the number of 
observations per country and Freq is the frequency of the observation per country scaled on 
the whole sample. 
Country ISSUER COUNTRY Nobs Freq. 
1 Netherlands Antilles 11 0.11% 
2 Austria 341 3.43% 
3 Belgium 605 6.08% 
4 Switzerland 12 0.12% 
5 Germany 1,881 18.90% 
6 Spain 979 9.83% 
7 Finland 440 4.42% 
8 France 1,980 19.89% 
9 Gabon 11 0.11% 
10 United Kingdom 22 0.22% 
11 Greece 363 3.65% 
12 Ireland 373 3.75% 
13 Italy 1,100 11.05% 
14 Luxembourg 187 1.88% 
15 Monaco 11 0.11% 
16 Netherlands 1,056 10.61% 
17 Portugal 451 4.53% 
18 Slovenia 121 1.22% 
19 Senegal 11 0.11% 
  Total 9,955 100.00% 
 
It can be seen that the “Datastream Europe EM Index” is an index 
mainly with firms located in the European Monetary Union. However, it 
seems that there are some exceptions; see countries 1, 4, 9, 10, 15 and 19. 
For example the Netherlands Antilles and Gabon do not have the EURO as 
their official currency. The company “Hunter Douglas NV” is a company 
from the Netherlands and Switzerland but has its registered office in 
Netherlands Antilles. Hence, Datastream classificates it as an European 
Monetary Union firm although the shares are issued outside the Union. The 
shares of the companies may be issued abroad because of tax advantages. 
Note that running the regressions from Table 5 without the 6 countries 
commented above results in nearly no differences, hence they are left in the 
sample. Note that France is the country with the biggest fraction in the 
sample. 
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3.1 On the measurement of financial distress 
 
Preve (2004) uses a standard definition of financial distress 
(FINDIST) based on the coverage ratio defined in Asquith, Gertner, and 
Scharfstein (1994). To calculate FINDIST, EBITD is used instead of 
EBITDA because of lack of data for “A” respectively amortization causing 
that less firms will tend to correspond to financial distress. 
 Defining the dummy variable FINDIST, a firm is in financial 
distress if:
 29
 
 
• (EBITDt-1 < Interest Paymentst-1) and (EBITDt < Interest Paymentst) 
Or 
• (EBITDt < Interest Paymentst * 80 %) 
 
In words a firm is considered to be in financial distress if it fails to 
generate enough EBITD to meet the interest payments for year t and t-1 or if 
it fails to generate enough EBITD to cover at least 80 % of the interest 
payments in a given year. In the regression analysis this variable is used 
with a one-year lag (FINDIST_LAG) to observe firms going into distress 
and then measure the effects on the firm‟s trade credit one year later when 
the effects of financial distress appear. Since yearly data is used, financial 
distress cannot be defined on an accurate date. Therefore it is not possible to 
control how far from the end of the fiscal year the firm started having 
problems that moved it into financial distress. Averaging across years and 
industries, 6.2 % of the observations in the sample correspond to firms in 
financial distress. Notice that the sample of Preve (2004) shows much more 
firms in financial distress.
30
 An explanation of the differing amount of firms 
corresponding to financial distress may be a result of different accounting 
                                                 
29
 FINDIST is equal to 1 if the firm is in financial distress and 0 otherwise. 
30
 In the sample of Preve (2004) correspond 17.52 % of the observations to financial 
distress. To increase the number of observations corresponding to financial distress I tried 
to change the second criteria in the definition of FINDIST. A change of the above criteria to 
“Interest Payments * 120 %” results in 6.4 % and an increase to 380 % results in 17.56 % 
observations in financial distress. Anyway I keep up the standard definition with the 80 % 
criteria. 
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standards, the different time horizon respectively different macroeconomic 
factors as well as that Preve (2004) uses a much broader sample containing 
more small firms which in general tend to be more often in financial distress 
(see also below). 
 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of FINDIST over Time 
The graph shows the evolution of FINDIST over time. FINDIST is a dummy variable that 
identifies firms in financial distress. 
 
The graph shows the evolution of the number of firms in financial 
distress during the sample period. Notice the sharp increase of firms in 
financial distress from 2000 to 2003. This could probably be explained by 
the “dotcom crisis” 2000 and the recession in the Western countries during 
2000 and 2001.
31
 
To get the information if the firm enters into financial distress at any 
time during the 11 year sample period a dummy variable TROUBLE is 
introduced. If a firm is in financial distress at some moment then 
TROUBLE is equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. Splitting the sample by 
TROUBLE, 215 firms (23.8 % of the sample) correspond to firms in the 
group of TROUBLE = 1 and the remaining 690 firms (76.2 % of the 
sample) are in the group of TROUBLE = 0. Notice that the size of the firms 
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 The pair wise correlation between the yearly mean of FINDIST and the real GDP growth 
of the EU 15 between 1998 and 2007 is -0.76. 
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with TROUBLE = 1 is significantly smaller than the size of those with 
TROUBLE = 0. This means that the sample contains much more healthy 
firms than distressed ones. The average level of CPI-adjusted sales is Euro 
2,512.86 million for firms with TROUBLE = 1 and Euro 4,052.01 million 
for TROUBLE = 0. A difference can also be observed when measuring size 
by CPI-adjusted assets; the average level of CPI-adjusted assets is Euro 
4,092.24 million for firms with TROUBLE = 1 and Euro 5,075.98 million 
for TROUBLE = 0. Notice that the firms of Preve (2004) are on the average 
smaller in terms of sales and assets.
32
 In detail, average sales and assets are 
much lower for the TROUBLE = 1 and TROUBLE = 0 group and hence for 
the whole sample because he uses a much bigger index and the bigger the 
sample the more observations and small firms it contains. Hence, since 
small firms tend to have financial problems more often, more firms 
correspond to financial distress. 
To identify firms that enter financial distress more than once in the 
sample a variable called LOTTROUBLE is created. It counts the number 
of times a firm enters financial distress. 158 firms enter financial distress 
only once in their sample life, 51 firms enter twice, 5 enter three times, and 
1 firm enters four times during the sample time (firms that correspond twice 
or more often in a row to financial distress are counted to enter into financial 
distress only once). 
For the purpose of this research it is interesting to identify the firms 
that enter into distress in the sample time and follow them throughout their 
distress process. To get information about the number of years a firm has 
spent in financial distress (while it is in distress) a counter variable called 
FDYS is defined. FDYS is the sum of years where FINDIST equals 1 in a 
row. Every time a firm is no longer classified as distressed, the variable 
FDYS is reset to zero. The implicit assumption in this specification is that a 
firm that goes out of financial distress is a firm that has undergone a 
successful restructuring process. FDYS allows to control for the time that 
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 The average numbers of Preve (2004): CPI-sales $550MM for TROUBLE=1 and 
$2,388MM for TROUBLE=0; CPI-assets $567MM for TROUBLE=1 and $2,609MM for 
TROUBLE=0. 
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the firms spent in financial distress which can be relevant in the level of 
trade credit. 
The variable TIMELINE is introduced with the aim to follow 
through time those firms that enter into financial distress at some moment in 
the sample period (similar to Preve (2004)). When a firm enters into 
financial distress TIMELINE takes the value 0. From there on, and using the 
variables FINDIST (that identifies the firms in financial distress in the 
present year) and FDYS (that counts the years in financial distress in a row), 
TIMELINE increases by one unit each year the firm stays in financial 
distress. This variable gives information about how many financially 
distressed years a firm has already gone through until a given moment in 
time (positive values of TIMELINE) as well as how far a healthy firm is 
from becoming financially distressed (negative values of TIMELINE). 
Table 4 shows the distribution of the firms in the TIMELINE along with 
some summary statistics. 
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Table 4: Distribution of firms along the Timeline 
This table shows the distribution of firms along the Timeline and some selected summary 
statistics.  The variables are defined in Table 1.  Nobs is the number of observation in each 
group and Freq is the Frequency.  TRCA is the average value of Trade Payables on Assets 
and TCCGS is the average value of Trade Payables on Cost of Goods Sold in each group.  
SALES(cpi) and ASSETS(cpi) in million Euro are the average value of Net Sales and 
Total Assets in each group.  Both variables are presented in constant values of Year 2005. 
Notice that Timeline represents firms that are at least once in financial distress during their 
sample life time. The last line represents statistics of the group of TROUBLE = 0, the firms 
that never enter into financial distress (whereas Timeline automatically represents the 
TROUBLE = 1 group). A table with winsorized variables can be found in the appendix. 
Timeline Nobs Freq TRCA TCCGS SALES(cpi) ASSETS(cpi) 
-10 6 0.26% 0.0527 0.1228 478.51 625.13 
-9 16 0.71% 0.1156 0.1350 2,552.77 1,928.02 
-8 29 1.28% 0.1603 -3.4425 1,742.27 1,857.07 
-7 40 1.77% 0.1517 -0.3802 2,018.60 1,847.22 
-6 80 3.53% 0.1505 0.3080 1,631.73 1,856.24 
-5 111 4.90% 0.1434 0.3564 2,391.94 3,424.71 
-4 145 6.40% 0.1418 0.2809 2,814.30 4,124.77 
-3 159 7.02% 0.1396 0.3646 2,743.63 4,221.60 
-2 172 7.59% 0.1298 0.2833 2,723.59 4,634.03 
-1 190 8.38% 0.1236 0.2538 2,656.05 5,542.33 
0 695 30.67% 0.1370 0.2596 3,234.30 5,101.32 
1 260 11.47% 0.1189 0.4199 2,958.64 4,964.37 
2 152 6.71% 0.1288 0.4751 990.69 1,625.29 
3 97 4.28% 0.1225 0.6623 344.46 761.36 
4 56 2.47% 0.1415 1.4229 270.80 628.12 
5 27 1.19% 0.1227 0.6443 134.05 727.65 
6 21 0.93% 0.1596 1.7858 237.72 362.75 
7 4 0.18% 0.0411 0.2826 15.48 67.94 
8 3 0.13% 0.0675 0.6853 20.31 68.75 
9 2 0.09% 0.0482 0.0000 2.11 42.52 
10 1 0.04% 0.0367 0.0000 2.17 133.92 
Total 2,266 100%         
TROUBLE = 0 7,689   0.1243 0.3024 4,039.67 5,081.52 
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3.2 On the measurement of trade credit 
 
Like Preve (2004) trade credit is measured in this work by scaling it 
on cost of goods sold (CGS) defining the following variable: 
 
360360 
sSoldCostofGood
PayablesTrade
TCCGS  
 
The median value of TCCGS360 in the sample is 59.5 days.
33
 This 
variable relates trade credit to the transaction that has generated it and shows 
the amount of purchases financed by trade credit.
34
 Using purchases in the 
denominator would be more exact but because the lack of data it is relied on 
cost of goods sold excluding depreciation as a proxy.
35
 Preve (2004) states 
that the use of this proxy brings in a negative bias in the measurement of 
TCCGS that is proportional to the value that the companies add to the 
product they sell. Companies with more value added (firms with a larger 
difference between CGS and purchases) will use an inaccurately high value 
in the denominator, causing TCCGS to be downward biased. 
In order to test the substitution provided by trade credit in the firm‟s 
capital structure, like in Preve (2004) three variables that capture different 
measures of trade credit as a portion of the capital structure are used. The 
first, TRCA is defined as the ratio of trade payables to the book value of 
assets, the second, TRCE as trade payables to the book value of equity 
(common shareholders‟ equity), and lastly, TCFD as trade payables to the 
book value of long term debt.
36
 
 
                                                 
33
 The sample of Preve shows 39.3 days. 
34
 This variable is widely used by practitioners to assess the payables ratio. Preve notes that 
the real trade credit on cost of goods sold is actually larger than the one measured by this 
variable. The bias goes against the results and is therefore not worrying when interpreting 
them. 
35
 See Preve (2004). 
36
 Preve (2004) uses in the denominator of TCFD total financial debt whereas this study 
uses long term debt. 
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sTotalAsset
lesTradePayab
TRCA    
Equity
lesTradePayab
TRCE      
btLongTermDe
lesTradePayab
TCFD    
 
TRCA shows the amount of financing that the firm obtains from 
suppliers as a percentage of the total capital. This means that it shows which 
portion of the firm‟s assets is financed by suppliers. TRCA is used as a 
scaling variable in several papers measuring trade payables. 
TCFD measures the substitution of trade credit and long term debt 
when firms are in financial distress. It is expected that trade credit 
substitutes financial credit when the latter is unavailable. Using TCFD as 
the dependent variable should provide evidence on it showing a positive 
sign in the coefficient for the financial distress variable. 
TRCE, a variable similar to TCFD measures the substitution effect 
between trade credit and equity. 
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Figure 6: Evolution of TCCGS and TRCA over time 
The panel shows the evolution of TCCGS and TRCA (Trade Credit on Cost of Goods Sold 
and Trade Credit on Assets) over time. 
 
Figure 7: Evolution of Sales and Assets over time 
The panel shows the evolution of the level of net sales and total assets (in million Euro) of 
the firms over time. 
 
Figure 6 shows that during the 11 years, TCCGS displays a positive 
trend while TRCA a slightly negative one. Since trade credit is generated by 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
year
Evolution of TCCGS and  TRCA over time
Evolution of TCCGS over time Evolution of TRCA over time
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
year
Evolution of Sales and Assets over time
yearlymeansalescpi yearlymeanassetscpi
40 
and closely related to sales, a slight decrease in TRCA can be observed 
despite an increase in TCCGS.
37
 Hence, the amount of purchases financed 
by trade credit increases over time especially in periods of an economic 
boom whereas the portion of assets financed by suppliers decreases slightly 
over the whole sample period.
38
 Note that the correlation coefficient of 
TRCA and TCCGS is 0.0752 and the trend over time tends to differ 
significantly.
39
 This trend may be caused by cost of goods sold that grew 
less than assets over the sample period.
 
An interpretation of this is that in an 
economic boom respectively periods of high growth, firms use relatively 
more trade credit to finance purchases. A further interpretation is that firms 
may grant more trade credit in periods of an economic boom and 
consequently firms use more trade credit to finance their purchases. Note 
that firms may use more trade credit additionally to other sources of finance 
in order to finance their high growth. 
The panel in Figure 7 shows that assets increase slightly more than 
sales. Additionally, it is very important to study the assets and sales of 
distressed firms over time. This is due to the tendency that firms in financial 
distress undergo asset sales and that they experience a decrease in their 
sales.
40
 
                                                 
37
 Both measures of trade credit use trade payables in the numerator, but TRCA has a 
denominator (assets) that grows faster than that of TCCGS. TCCGS is scaled by cost of 
goods sold and is highly correlated with sales (pair wise correlation between sales and cost 
of goods sold is 0.98). 
38
 Simplified, 1997 to 2000 and 2003 to 2006 are classified as economic boom the periods 
whereas the years 2000 to 2003 as economic bust period. 
39
 The pair wise correlation between GDP growth and the yearly mean of TCCGS is -0.12 
while the correlation between GDP growth and the yearly mean of TRCA is 0.30. Notice 
that these correlations are lower than those in Preve (2004). A reason for the low 
correlation may be the “dotcom crisis” 2000 reflecting the credit shortage in the market 
crash. 
40
 For asset sales see Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994), Brown, James and 
Mooradian (1994) and Pulvino (1998); for decreases in sales see Altman (1984) and Opler 
and Titman (1994). 
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Figure 8: Evolution of the growth rate of Assets 
The graph shows the evolution of the growth rate of assets and the TIMELINE. The growth 
rate of assets is calculated using CPI-adjusted levels of assets. The plotted variable 
represents the firms in financial distress (TROUBLE = 1 group) whereas the horizontal line 
in the graph represents the non time varying mean of the plotted variable in a sub-sample of 
firms that have TROUBLE = 0. Notice that for the graph the non time varying mean and 
the growth rates are winsorized with p(0.01). Timeline = 0 represents the moment in which 
the firm enters in financial distress. 
 
Figure 9: Evolution of the growth rate of Sales 
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The graph shows the evolution of the growth rate of sales and the TIMELINE. The growth 
rate of sales is calculated using CPI-adjusted levels of assets. The plotted variable 
represents the firms in financial distress (TROUBLE = 1 group) whereas the horizontal line 
in the graph represents the non time varying mean of the plotted variable in a sub-sample of 
firms that have TROUBLE = 0. Notice that for the graph the non time varying mean and 
the growth rates are winsorized with p(0.01). Timeline = 0 represents the moment in which 
the firm enters in financial distress. 
 
The graphs in Figure 8 and 9 help to understand the asset sales effect 
and the decrease in sales during financial distress. They show an analysis of 
the behavior of net sales growth and total assets growth during the period of 
time covered by the TIMELINE. The plotted variable with quadratic points 
shows the behavior of a sub-sample of firms that enter financial distress at a 
given point in the sample (TROUBLE = 1 group). To obtain a reference 
point in the graphs, a horizontal line representing the non-time-varying 
mean of the plotted variable for the rest of the sample is drawn (TROUBLE 
= 0 group). Note that TROUBLE = 0 represents firms that do not enter 
financial distress during the sample time whereas firms with TROUBLE = 1 
represents firms that enter into financial distress at least once during the 
sample period. Notice that TIMELINE = 0 represents the moment in which 
the firm enters into financial distress. 
The graphs further show that the growth rate of assets and sales is 
affected in a similar way by the firms entering into financial distress.
41
 The 
assets growth drops significantly and is well below the horizontal line of the 
non-troubled firms, reflecting the need for cash of the firms in financial 
distress. Furthermore the figures show that a firm‟s assets growth is reduced 
by 67 % during TIMELINE = 2 whereas sales also drop by 67 %. The 
decrease in sales may be interpreted by a company‟s internal problems and 
loss in confidence in a firm‟s products and the survival of a firm in general. 
When a firm is in financial distress then customers are at risk to lose for 
example the product warranty in case of the bankruptcy of the supplier. 
Notice that Petersen and Rajan (1997) found that firms have a greater 
extension of trade credit when they have negative income and negative sales 
                                                 
41
 The sample shows few firms with the maximum values of TIMELINE = 10 and -10, 
hence the graph is cut at TIMELINE = -7 and 5. 
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growth. Consequently, firms with negative sales growth should tend to have 
higher receivables because they frequently try to boost their sales by 
granting trade credit to low quality customers. 
 
44 
 
Figure 10: Evolution of the mean of TCCGS 
The graph shows the evolution of the mean of TCCGS (trade payables on cost of goods 
sold) and the TIMELINE.  The plotted variable represents the firms in financial distress 
(TROUBLE = 1 group) whereas the horizontal line in the graph represents the non time 
varying mean of the plotted variable in a sub-sample of firms that have TROUBLE = 0. 
Notice that for the graph the non time varying mean and the mean of TCCGS are 
winsorized with p(0.01). Timeline = 0 represents the moment in which the firm enters in 
financial distress. 
 
Figure 11: Evolution of the mean of TRCA 
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The graph shows the evolution of the mean of TRCA (trade payables on total assets) and 
the TIMELINE.  The plotted variable represents the firms in financial distress (TROUBLE 
= 1 group) whereas the horizontal line in the graph represents the non time varying mean of 
the plotted variable in a sub-sample of firms that have TROUBLE = 0. Notice that for the 
graph the non time varying mean and the mean of TRCA are winsorized with p(0.01). 
Timeline = 0 represents the moment in which the firm enters in financial distress. 
 
Figure 10 and 11 show the behavior of TCCGS and TRCA along the 
TIMELINE when firms enter into financial distress. The graph in Figure 10 
shows that firms in financial distress use more trade credit because the 
TCCGS line rises well above the horizontal non-time-varying mean of not 
distressed firms. There is a clear peak in TCCGS after firms enter financial 
distress. Notice that until TIMELINE = 5 there is a trend towards the use of 
trade credit to finance purchases. Furthermore it is interesting that firms in 
the TROUBLE = 1 sample use trade credit more frequently during the 
whole TIMELINE. 
In contrast to Preve (2004) a departure from the horizontal line in the 
last years before entering into financial distress cannot be observed , rather 
the opposite respectively not until TIMELINE = 0. He suggests that firms 
that start sliding down in profitability start using more expensive and 
“forgiving” trade credit and replace the cheaper but “stricter” financial 
credit. An interpretation could be that European firms react to profitability 
problems slower than US firms. Hence, they start increasing the use of trade 
credit not before entering into trade credit. Molina and Preve (2009) report 
for firms in the pre-financial distress stage profitability problems and an 
increase in trade receivables whereas for firms in the financial distress stage 
they suggest cash flow problems and a decrease in trade receivables.
42
 
Consequently it is expected that financially distressed European firms 
reduce the amount of trade credit they offer whereas Figure 10 suggests that 
they increase the use of trade credit.
43
 
The graph in Figure 11 shows for TRCA no clear tendency after 
firms enter into financial distress. However, firms in the TROUBLE = 1 
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 Notice that Preve (2004) examines trade payables whereas Molina and Preve (2009) trade 
receivables. 
43
 Notice that in the empirical part of this study only trade payables are examined. 
46 
group as represented by the graph by the line with the quadratic points show 
mostly higher levels of TRCA (higher TRCA and hence higher trade 
payables or higher portion of assets financed by suppliers) than the rest of 
the sample (the horizontal line). 
3.3 On the other control variables 
 
Like Preve (2004) in this model some other control variables are 
used, specifically for size and sales growth. Larger firms are expected to use 
their market power in trade relations, especially when they can choose 
among a large number of clients. Wilner (2000) found that if one party 
generates a large percentage of its partners profits, it is more willing to enter 
into a seemingly unfavorable contract. Hence, dependent companies grant 
more trade credit. In order to control for this asymmetry of power measures 
like LNSALES and LNASSETS are defined.
44
 
Likewise it is controlled for sales growth in the model as firms with 
sharpe increases or decreases in sales may experience it from exogenous 
factors. Hence, it is likely that these firms show similar changes in trade 
payables. Consequently, by suppliers such firms may are seen as fast 
growing firms which may positively affect the amount of trade credit their 
offer, or the opposite when sales decrease steeply. To control for variations 
in sales growth the variable WDIFSALES_SLES is used as the difference 
of SALESt and SALESt-1 scaled on SALESt-1. Notice that this growth rate is 
winsorized with p(0.01) to reduce the impact of outliers and potential 
erroneous data points.  
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 Preve (2004) uses in some models additionally a firm‟s market share and the Herfindahl 
index of the industry to measure market power respectively to control for the asymmetry of 
power. 
47 
4. Empirical Analysis of the Base Case Model 
 
The observation consists of a panel of European Monetary Union 
firms over an 11 year period. The firms show, both, variations in time series 
and cross sectional patterns that are captured in the model. Likewise Preve 
(2004) a variable for firm-level unobserved factors that might affect the 
amount of trade credit the firms receive from suppliers is used. Chapter 4 
analyses the response of trade credit to financial distress and the substitution 
effect. 
4.1 The Methodology 
 
To analyze the trade credit that distressed firms receive from their 
suppliers, the following equation is used: 
 
TCit = γi + β1*FINDIST_LAGit + ψ*Xit + εit  (1) 
 
The dependent variable, TCit is a measure of trade credit. 
FINDIST_LAG is the first lag of the financial distress at firm level and Xit 
is a matrix of controls. γi is a vector of dummy variables for firms and 
countries in the fixed effects estimation, and dummy variable for industries 
and countries in the pooled OLS model. The matrix of control includes a 
measure of size, typically LNASSETS and the sales growth, 
WDIFSALES_SLES. In certain specifications FDYSit (and FDYS
2
it) 
controls for the time that the firms spent in financial distress. The 
estimations with pooled OLS include clustering procedures, for example for 
firms (company cluster) in the computation of the standard errors for the 
purpose to tolerate an unspecified correlation between different observations 
of the same firm in the sample. 
As a first approach equation (1) is estimated on the sample to get the 
amount of trade credit firms use in financial distress. Positive coefficients 
for FINDIST_LAG would imply that financially distressed firms use more 
48 
trade credit from suppliers than healthy ones. The results are presented in 
Table 5 and 6.  
4.2 The response of trade credit to financial distress 
 
If suppliers support firms in financial distress, β1, the coefficient of 
the dummy variable identifying financially distressed firms, 
FINDIST_LAG, should be positive and significant. More specifically, in the 
model without FDYS the coefficient, β1, tells how many more days of trade 
credit are taken by firms in financial distress (with respect to non-distressed 
firms). One of the specifications of the model controls for the time that the 
firm has spent in financial distress, which may be an important factor in 
trade credit. The coefficient on FDYS controls for this and provides some 
indication on the shape of the effect of financial distress as a function of 
time. This information however, comes at a certain cost in terms of 
multicollinearity, since the correlation coefficient between FINDIST_LAG 
and FDYS is, fairly high.
45
 Note that the correlation of FDYS and FDYS
2
 is 
very high as well. Furthermore, the joint use of them in a model results in 
insignificant coefficients for both. Hence, in contrast to Preve (2004) only 
models with FDYS but without FDYS
2
 are reported since this improves the 
coefficients on FDYS due to the multicollinearity of FDYS and FDYS
2
.
46
 
Likewise Preve (2004) it is assumed that suppliers can force a firm 
into bankruptcy but it is not possible for them to send it into financial 
distress. In detail, one supplier‟s reduction of trade credit cannot bring 
healthy firms into financial distress. However, suppliers can force 
financially distressed firms to file for bankruptcy if they are not repaid on 
time. 
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 The correlation of FINDIST_LAG and FDYS is 0.62. 
46
 The correlation of FDYS and FDYS
2
 is 0.88 and the correlation of FINDIST_LAG and 
FDYS
2
 is 0.46. The results with FDYS
2
 are not reported but can be provided on request. 
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Table 5: Trade Credit and Financial Distress 
This table shows the results of the estimation of Equation (1) for trade payables. The Dependent Variable is TCCGS, Trade Payables on Cost of Goods Sold. 
FINDIST_LAG is a dummy variable that is 1 if a firm is in financial distress as defined in the diploma thesis and 0 otherwise. FDYS is a variable that counts how many 
years the firm has spent in Financial Distress. WDIFSALES_SLES is the first difference in sales scaled by sales, notice that this variable is winsorized at p(0.01). 
LNASSETS is the natural log of total assets. The sample is a selected sample as described in chapter 4 of the Datastream “Europe EM” index from 1997 to 2007. The 
value of t-stats is shown in brackets. T-stats that are clustered imply robust standard errors. Coefficients with *** are significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10% in a 
two-tails test. Model 1 and 2 are company fixed effects models. Model 3 is a random effects model. Model 4 to 9 are the main regressions with country and industry fixed 
effects. Model 10 to 15 are pooled OLS models. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 
findist_lag -31.09 -40.87* -23.51 70.99*** 67.89*** 70.99 -18.94 -18.79 -18.94 77.80** 77.80* 77.80* -13.46 -13.46 -13.46 
 
(-1.568) (-1.901) (-1.202) (2.817) (2.661) (1.626) (-0.607) (-0.598) (-1.175) (2.302) (1.773) (1.792) (-0.828) (-0.679) (-0.751) 
wdifsales_sles -9.764 -10.58 -6.895 28.08* 28.67** 28.08 27.02* 29.17** 27.02 36.50* 36.50 36.50 36.70 36.70 36.70 
 
(-0.911) (-0.970) (-0.651) (1.943) (1.968) (1.367) (1.833) (1.963) (1.315) (1.652) (1.608) (1.486) (1.624) (1.571) (1.515) 
fdys 
 
9.552 
    
65.41*** 64.51*** 65.41** 
   
67.72** 67.72** 67.72** 
  
(0.965) 
    
(5.076) (4.973) (2.728) 
   
(2.497) (2.213) (2.771) 
lnassets 
         
7.176 7.176 7.176 8.639** 8.639 8.639* 
          
(1.611) (1.299) (1.387) (1.984) (1.593) (1.785) 
Constant 107.6*** 107.2*** 129.2*** 95.83*** 95.90*** 95.83*** 94.15*** 93.89*** 94.15*** -54.19 -54.19 -54.19 -86.53 -86.53 -86.53 
  (26.03) (25.41) (5.943) (15.29) (15.22) (10.63) (14.92) (14.79) (10.48) (-0.613) (-0.545) (-0.530) (-1.006) (-0.896) (-0.916) 
Observations 7271 7226 7271 7271 7271 7271 7226 7226 7226 7270 7270 7270 7225 7225 7225 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 . 0.019 0.013 0.019 0.023 0.017 0.023 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Adjusted R-squared -0.137 -0.138 
       
0.00222 0.00222 0.00222 0.00590 0.00590 0.00590 
F test 1.630 1.553 
 
6.447 5.942 5.726 12.95 12.42 6.432 4.033 6.679 4.576 3.469 6.695 5.908 
Number of company 880 880 880 
            
Prob >F 0 0   0.00159 0.00264 0.0152 1.96e-08 4.26e-08 0.00580 0.00730 0.00351 0.0196 0.00802 0.00200 0.00532 
Model Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
absorb company company 
 
country industry country country industry country 
      
cluster           industry     industry company country industry company country industry 
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Table 6: Trade credit and Financial Distress with 380 % criteria 
This table shows the results of the estimation of Equation (1) for trade payables. The Dependent Variable is TCCGS, Trade Payables on Cost of Goods Sold. 
FINDIST_LAG is a dummy variable that is 1 if a firm is in financial distress and 0 otherwise, notice that for this table a 380 % criteria instead of the 80 % standard 
definition from chapter 3.1 is used in order to get a similar percentage of firms in financial distress as Preve (2004). FDYS is a variable that counts how many years the 
firm has spent in Financial Distress. WDIFSALES_SLES is the first difference in sales scaled by sales, notice that this variable is winsorized at p(0.01). LNASSETS is 
the natural log of total assets. The sample is a selected sample as described in chapter 4 of the Datastream “Europe EM” index from 1997 to 2007. The value of t-stats is 
shown in brackets. T-stats that are clustered imply robust standard errors. Coefficients with *** are significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10% in a two-tails test. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 
findist_lag -0.380 3.390 4.457 48.81*** 58.10*** 48.81** 34.14* 36.92* 34.14 59.61** 59.61** 59.61** 39.81 39.81 39.81 
 
(-0.0293) (0.239) (0.349) (3.161) (3.765) (2.240) (1.712) (1.844) (0.886) (2.323) (2.668) (2.542) (0.945) (1.031) (1.017) 
wdifsales_sles -9.607 -11.64 -6.659 30.53** 30.19** 30.53 32.04** 32.82** 32.04 38.58* 38.58* 38.58 41.06* 41.06* 41.06* 
 
(-0.895) (-1.060) (-0.628) (2.122) (2.080) (1.611) (2.176) (2.210) (1.698) (1.819) (1.818) (1.665) (1.925) (1.964) (1.798) 
fdys 
 
-4.057 
    
7.131 10.22* 7.131 
   
9.564 9.564 9.564 
  
(-0.829) 
    
(1.222) (1.749) (0.602) 
   
(0.922) (0.748) (0.868) 
lnassets 
         
6.589 6.589 6.589 6.775 6.775 6.775 
          
(1.328) (1.113) (1.173) (1.421) (1.191) (1.254) 
Constant 105.9*** 107.3*** 126.8*** 91.21*** 89.72*** 91.21*** 90.38*** 88.44*** 90.38*** -48.05 -48.05 -48.05 -53.14 -53.14 -53.14 
 
(23.12) (22.22) (5.805) (13.72) (13.45) (13.70) (13.45) (13.13) (12.54) (-0.470) (-0.431) (-0.423) (-0.544) (-0.502) (-0.489) 
Observations 7271 7226 7271 7271 7271 7271 7226 7226 7226 7270 7270 7270 7225 7225 7225 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 . 0.020 0.014 0.020 0.020 0.015 0.020 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Prob >F 1.000 1.000 
 
0.000571 7.63e-05 0.0880 0.000900 5.12e-05 0.0298 0.0989 0.0214 0.105 0.000926 0.00935 0.0107 
Number of company 880 880 880 
            
F test 0.401 0.548 
 
7.476 9.493 2.906 5.502 7.513 4.008 2.098 4.203 2.472 4.704 4.747 4.950 
Adjusted R-squared -0.138 -0.139 
       
0.00299 0.00299 0.00299 0.00328 0.00328 0.00328 
Model Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
absorb company company 
 
country industry country country industry country 
      
cluster           industry     industry company country industry company country industry 
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4.2.1 Results and Interpretation 
 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the base case models. Notice that 
only winsorized difsales_sles (wdifsales_sles) are used in order to reduce 
the impact of outliers and potential erroneous data points.
 
Winsorizing 
improves the significance of the coefficients of difsales_sles slightly and the 
most coefficients become positive.
47
 
The coefficients of determination R
2
, showing the amount of 
variance of TCCGS360 explained by the dependent variables, are very low 
in all of the models. R
2„s are between 0.1 % and 1.9 % implying that the 
models may not be appropriate for the sample. The sample of Preve shows 
much higher R
2„s, they are around 0.7 (70 %) for the fixed effects models 
and around 0.15 for the pooled OLS models. This makes an interpretation of 
the results difficult, hence, the results have a limited explanatory power. 
Because of the considerable deviation to Preve (2004) it seems that there are 
big differences between the US market and firms of the European Monetary 
Union. Hence, the models of Preve for the US do not apply well for the 
sample. Because of this and in order to find a suitable description of trade 
credit behavior a large variation of regressions and clusters were calculated. 
Fdys shows mostly significant coefficients implying that the duration 
of financial distress has an impact on the trade credit use. Lnassets shows 
few significant coefficients for the pooled OLS models, implying that it may 
not improve the model significantly. Model (1) with company fixed effects 
does not show significant coefficients compared to the result of Preve 
(2004, 123 (1)). Notice that this study includes relatively few observations 
per firm, hence, the many degrees of freedom may make a robust and 
significant estimation difficult. Thus, by using country fixed effects the 
coefficients may be better estimated. Model (2) with (company) fixed 
effects and the use of fdys shows surprisingly that distressed firms take 
40.87 days less trade credit relatively to healthy ones, significant at the 10 % 
                                                 
47
 The tables with “normal” difsales_sles are not reported in this diploma thesis but can be 
provided on request. 
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level. Hence the time firms have spent in financial distress improves the 
significance of the model compared to the model (1). The coefficient might 
be negative because of the low percentage of firms in financial distress. 
Model (3) with random effects does not show significant coefficients. 
Explaining one model more in detail, model (4) with country fixed effects 
shows a ratio of F (2, 7251) of 6.45 and a Prob > F of 0.0016. Since the 
Prob > F is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis that the coefficients on all 
variables in the model equal zero (for both findist_lag and wdifsales_sles) 
can be rejected with a 95 % level of confidence. Hence, the joint variables 
are statistically significant at the 95 % level of confidence. Absorbing the 
country in the model shows an F (17, 7251) of 7.541 (with P=0). Further, 
the coefficient on findist_lag shows that firms in financial distress take 
nearly 71 days more trade credit relatively to those not being in financial 
distress significant at the 1 % level. Furthermore, the t-value of findist_lag 
with 2.82 (> 1.96) shows the importance of the variable for the model. 
Concluding, the variable wdifsales_sles is significant at the 10 % level and 
hence improves the model. Model (5) shows a quite similar result as model 
(4). Model (6) with country fixed effects and industry cluster deteriorates 
the significance of the coefficient for findist_lag. Models (7 to 9): In order 
to refine the previous model more variables are used but it weakens the 
coefficients on TCCGS360, making them statistically insignificant and 
negative.
48
 Models (10 to 12) are pooled OLS models with the additional 
variable lnassets and either company, country or industry clusters. The 
additional variable results in a positive and significant coefficient compared 
to model (1). The coefficient shows that firms in financial distress take 
about 78 days more trade credit relatively to those not being in financial 
distress. Notice that the additional use of lnassets in the model limits the last 
statement. Models (13 to 15): The two additional variables compared to 
                                                 
48
 Notice that the clustering option adjusts standard errors for intragroup correlations. It 
specifies that the observations are independent across groups (clusters), but not necessarily 
within groups. Clustering helps in the treatment of residuals when observations repeat in 
time. Notice also that the company cluster implies the country and industry cluster because 
one firm has only one country and one industry. Finally, note that “absorb” generates 
dummies. 
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model (1) do not improve it, making the coefficients on findist_lag negative 
and statistically insignificant. 
Table 6 can be interpreted as follows: By softening the inancial 
distress criteria resulting in a similar percentage of firms in financial distress 
like Preve (2004), the significance levels improve compared to Table 5. The 
time that distressed firms take more trade credit declines for example for 
model (4) from about 71 days to 49 days. Note that the time may get 
reduced because the firms that are heavily financially distressed become 
diluted. 
Since the coefficients on findist_lag are positive and significant, 
insignificant but also negative and significant the model can only partly 
support that firms in financial distress take significantly longer terms to 
repay their suppliers than healthier firms. In the case of the fixed effects 
model (4) it can be observed that firms in financial distress take 71 more 
days to repay their suppliers than firms with good financial standing. Fdys 
shows significant coefficients which indicates the importance of the 
duration of financial distress on the trade credit use. However, the models 
with significant coefficients on fdys show no significant coefficients on 
findist_lag. This suggests that the duration of years firms stay in financial 
distress does not improve the model because of the high multicollinearity. 
Another interpretation is that due to the already mentioned high 
multicollinearity it seems that a separate identification of the time of distress 
is not possible. Notice that despite various models and regressions the 
dependent variables do not describe the variance of trade credit well as 
highlighted by the low R
2
. 
Notice that the median value of TCCGS360 (that shows the amount 
of purchases financed by trade credit) is higher in Europe compared to the 
US as well as the coefficients on findist_lag are higher in Europe. A 
possible interpretation of this is that American suppliers are more restrictive 
and do not satisfy trade credit even if buyers demand more.
49
 Furthermore, 
the use of credit insurers may have the effect of less trade credit supply or 
                                                 
49
 For typical credit periods see Figure 3. 
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use as they tend to cut the limits earlier. Note that in the use of credit 
insurers there are large variations between European countries and 
industries. A further reason for the different results may be different 
accounting systems in the US and Europe. In order not to get an averaged 
inclination coefficient the regressions are applied only on the country with 
the most observations in Chapter 4.4.
50
 
Finally, notice that the results do not imply that suppliers voluntarily 
offer to extend longer trade credit terms to financially distressed firms or 
that clients postpone repayment. Anyway, the evidence indicates that the 
number of days it takes to repay the suppliers is higher for financially 
distressed debtors.  
4.3 The substitution effect 
 
It is expected that firms in financial distress increase their use of 
trade credit to substitute other sources of capital that become unavailable 
when they face financial distress. To address this point like Preve (2004) 
did, equation (1) is applied on different sets of dependent variables, on 
TRCA, TRCE and TCFD. The results are presented in Table 7 and 8. 
Notice, to estimate the equation, a random effects model, a pooled OLS 
model and fixed effect models are used for each of the alternative dependent 
variables. 
Notice that the substitution of trade credit with TRCA shows the 
participation of trade payables in the capital structure. Finding a positive 
coefficient for the dummy identifying firms in financial distress would 
indicate that the relative importance of trade payables in the capital structure 
increases when the firm is in financial distress. From the literature it is 
known that firms in financial distress undergo asset sales and experience a 
decrease in sales. However, although asset sales result in a new level of 
assets, the coefficient still captures the relative importance of trade payables 
in the capital structure. Since TRCA does not show the relative change with 
respect to financial debt and equity, the two main sources of capital, TCFD 
                                                 
50
 According to Table 3 is it France. 
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and TRCE are considered separately using them as the dependent variables 
of the model. As commented above, the coefficient of the dummy variable 
identifying firms in financial distress tells us the relative change in trade 
payables with respect to financial debt and equity.
51
 
 
                                                 
51
 Notice that this work uses long term debt to calculate TCFD whereas Preve (2004) uses 
financial debt. 
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Table 7: Substitution Effect between Trade Credit and Financial Distress 
This table shows the result of the estimation of Equation (1).  The Dependent Variables are TRCA, Trade Payables on Total Assets, TRCE, Trade Payables on 
Shareholder‟s Equity, and TCFD, Trade Payables on Financial Debt.  FINDIST_LAG is a dummy variable that is 1 if a firm is in financial distress as defined in the 
diploma thesis and 0 otherwise.  WDIFSALES_SLES is the first difference in sales scaled by sales, notice that this variable is winsorized at p(0.01). LNASSETS is the 
natural log of total assets.  The sample is a selected sample as described in chapter 4 of the Datastream “Europe EM” index from 1997 to 2007. The value of t-stats is 
shown in brackets. T-stats that are clustered imply robust standard errors. Coefficients with *** are significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10% in a two-tails test. 
Model 1, 6 and 11 are company fixed effects models. Model 2, 7 and 12 are random effects models. Model 3, 4, 8, 9, 13 and 14 are the main regressions with country and 
industry fixed effects. Model 5, 10 and 15 are pooled OLS models. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCE TRCE TRCE TRCE TRCE TCFD TCFD TCFD TCFD TCFD 
findist_lag 0.00950*** 0.00856*** 0.000920 0.0112** 0.0139* 1.910*** 2.114*** 2.194*** 2.266*** 2.224 -34.56** -31.35* -6.041 -10.90 -13.97 
 
(3.590) (3.279) (0.208) (2.561) (1.781) (3.313) (4.451) (4.767) (4.869) (1.425) (-2.004) (-1.899) (-0.359) (-0.641) (-1.155) 
wdifsales_sles 0.00389*** 0.00386*** 0.00414 0.00777*** 0.00702** 0.0258 0.194 0.219 0.167 0.228 11.02 13.04 19.38** 18.20* 19.49 
 
(2.740) (2.744) (1.608) (3.067) (2.177) (0.0833) (0.716) (0.815) (0.620) (0.814) (1.202) (1.470) (2.000) (1.871) (1.026) 
lnsales 
    
0.00622*** 
    
0.0139 
    
-3.514* 
     
(4.563) 
    
(0.256) 
    
(-1.703) 
Constant 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.124*** -0.00368 0.465*** 0.434*** 0.417*** 0.421*** 0.130 24.30*** 36.63*** 21.45*** 21.90*** 94.39** 
 
(224.0) (44.57) (110.8) (112.0) (-0.133) (3.836) (3.108) (3.548) (3.577) (0.123) (6.993) (3.468) (5.233) (5.339) (2.177) 
Observations 7306 7306 7306 7306 7300 7307 7307 7307 7307 7301 6775 6775 6775 6775 6772 
R-squared 0.003 . 0.061 0.102 0.016 0.002 . 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.001 . 0.004 0.008 0.001 
Adjusted R-squared -0.134 
   
0.0159 -0.136 
   
0.00296 -0.144 
   
0.000709 
Number of company 883 883 
   
883 883 
   
858 858 
   
Prob >F 0 
 
0.256 0.000169 1.99e-05 0 
 
5.10e-06 4.28e-06 0.434 0 
 
0.134 0.155 0.249 
F test 10.08 
 
1.362 8.694 8.265 5.489 
 
12.21 12.38 0.913 2.751 
 
2.012 1.868 1.374 
Model Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS 
absorb company 
 
country industry 
 
company 
 
country industry 
 
company 
 
country industry 
 
cluster         company         company         company 
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Table 8: Substitution Effect between TC and FD with 380 % criteria 
This table shows the result of the estimation of Equation (1).  The Dependent Variables are TRCA, Trade Payables on Total Assets, TRCE, Trade Payables on 
Shareholder‟s Equity, and TCFD, Trade Payables on Financial Debt.  FINDIST_LAG is a dummy variable that is 1 if a firm is in financial distress as defined in the 
diploma thesis and 0 otherwise, notice that for this table a 380 % criteria instead of the 80 % standard definition from chapter 3.1 is used in order to get a similar 
percentage of firms in financial distress as Preve (2004). WDIFSALES_SLES is the first difference in sales scaled by sales, notice that this variable is winsorized at 
p(0.01). LNASSETS is the natural log of total assets.  The sample is a selected sample as described in chapter 4 of the Datastream “Europe EM” index from 1997 to 
2007. The value of t-stats is shown in brackets. T-stats that are clustered imply robust standard errors. Coefficients with *** are significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 
10% in a two-tails test. Model 1, 6 and 11 are company fixed effects models. Model 2, 7 and 12 are random effects models. Model 3, 4, 8, 9, 13 and 14 are the main 
regressions with country and industry fixed effects. Model 5, 10 and 15 are pooled OLS models. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCE TRCE TRCE TRCE TRCE TCFD TCFD TCFD TCFD TCFD 
findist_lag 0.00278 0.00253 0.000978 0.00773*** 0.00844 1.062*** 1.076*** 1.075*** 1.109*** 1.053** -13.76 -16.21 -19.11* -16.95* -21.72*** 
 
(1.593) (1.472) (0.354) (2.869) (1.560) (2.799) (3.568) (3.738) (3.867) (2.042) (-1.265) (-1.561) (-1.913) (-1.703) (-3.123) 
wdifsales_sles 0.00396*** 0.00394*** 0.00416 0.00808*** 0.00746** 0.0639 0.270 0.311 0.243 0.303 10.39 12.16 19.54** 18.09* 19.09 
 
(2.782) (2.800) (1.623) (3.200) (2.320) (0.206) (0.998) (1.164) (0.906) (0.922) (1.131) (1.369) (2.026) (1.866) (1.005) 
lnsales 
    
0.00608*** 
    
-0.0184 
    
-3.877* 
     
(4.493) 
    
(-0.262) 
    
(-1.890) 
Constant 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.123*** -0.00155 0.390*** 0.364** 0.348*** 0.353*** 0.730 24.92*** 37.79*** 24.37*** 24.24*** 104.9** 
 
(202.0) (44.33) (104.4) (105.1) (-0.0561) (2.904) (2.476) (2.790) (2.833) (0.530) (6.423) (3.536) (5.588) (5.562) (2.415) 
Observations 7306 7306 7306 7306 7300 7307 7307 7307 7307 7301 6775 6775 6775 6775 6772 
Number of company 883 883 
   
883 883 
   
858 858 
   
F test 4.893 
 
1.403 9.532 8.040 3.917 
 
7.833 8.005 2.748 1.542 
 
3.779 3.112 3.801 
R-squared 0.002 . 0.061 0.102 0.016 0.001 . 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.001 . 0.005 0.008 0.002 
Adjusted R-squared -0.136 
   
0.0159 -0.136 
   
0.00176 -0.145 
   
0.00130 
Prob >F 0 
 
0.246 7.34e-05 2.74e-05 0 
 
0.000400 0.000337 0.0419 0 
 
0.0229 0.0446 0.0100 
Model Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS 
absorb company 
 
country industry 
 
company 
 
country industry 
 
company 
 
country industry 
 
cluster         company         company         company 
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4.3.1 Results and Interpretation 
 
The R
2‟s of the models are between 0.1 % and 10.2 % which is much 
better compared to the models for the response of trade credit to financial 
distress. Notice that Preve (2004) reports for the models of the substitution 
effect R
2‟s between 6 % and 71 %. Hence, the models are not as appropriate 
for firms of the European Monetary Union. The positive coefficients for 
findist_lag in Table 7 for model (1) and (5) indicate that firms in financial 
distress increase trade credit in their capital structure by almost 1 % in the 
fixed effects model and 1.4 % considering the results of the pooled OLS. 
Notice that this is a relative increase, since it is measured relative to the 
other sources of financing, and is therefore meaningful even taking into 
account that firms in financial distress undergo asset sales as noted above. In 
columns (6) to (10) TRCE is used as the dependent variable to measure the 
substitution effect of trade credit with respect to equity. With the exception 
of the pooled OLS model the coefficients on FINDIST_LAG are positive 
and significant suggesting that the level of trade payables decreases less 
than the book value of equity in financially distressed firms. A possible 
explanation for this result is that firms in financial distress incur in losses 
that diminish the book value of equity and thus the ratio tends to go up. 
However, the result suggests that the level of trade credit does not decrease 
at the same speed. 
The columns (11) to (15) of Table 7 consider the substitution effect 
between trade payables and long term debt. The results for TCFD differ 
from those of TRCA and TRCE and those of Preve (2004). The difference 
may come from the fact that he uses financial debt whereas in this study 
long term debt is used in the denominator of TCFD. For example, the fixed 
effects model and the random effects model of TCFD show negative 
significant coefficients. This suggests that long term debt is not replaced by 
trade payables in the financially distressed firm‟s capital structure, rather the 
opposite is true. Table 8 with the alternative definition of financial distress 
(the 380 % criteria) shows also negative coefficients for the models of 
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TCFD. This result is really surprising since it is against fundamental 
findings in the literature, the pecking order theory and contrary to that of 
Preve (2004). A possible explanation for this result is that TCFD is 
determined by unknown factors since the R
2‟s are very low (partly nearly 0) 
except for the industry fixed effects model. Note that the correlation of an 
unknown factor with findist_lag may produce such a surprising result. 
However, the result implies that banks grant relatively more credit than 
suppliers of trade credit to financially distressed firms. 
To sum up, the results from Table 7 and 8 tend to support the 
hypothesis that trade payables provide a substitution for other sources of 
financing like total assets and equity for firms in financial distress. Notice 
that this study cannot support the hypothesis that distressed firms substitute 
long term debt with trade payables when the former is unavailable. Rather, 
the negative coefficient suggests that distressed firms increase their financial 
debt relative to trade payables. An interpretation of this result is that 
financially distressed European Monetary Union firms may obtain financial 
debt easier than trade credit and equity as they are more bank-oriented 
whereas US firms are more market-oriented.
52  
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 Rajan and Zingales (1995) classify for example France, Germany and Italy as bank-
oriented countries and the US and UK as market-oriented countries. 
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4.4 Financial distress and trade credit for France 
 
Preve (2004) mentioned that it would be interesting to study the 
reaction of suppliers to financial distress in France because Biais and 
Malecot (1996) report a heavy use of trade credit in France where the 
suppliers do not get anything in the case of bankruptcy of the debtor. Hence, 
this section investigates this country. Furthermore, since France shows the 
biggest fraction in the sample, its investigation should be illuminative as the 
examination of a single country does not have the drawbacks of an averaged 
inclination coefficient from different countries when doing regression 
analysis. 
Notice that according to Table 3 19.89 % of the 1.980 observations 
represent French firms which adds up to 180 firms. From these 180 firms 
belong 31 firms to the TROUBLE = 1 group. To get an idea of the response 
of trade credit to financial distress and the substitution effect equation (1) is 
applied. 
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Table 9: Trade Credit and Financial Distress in France 
This table shows the results of the estimation of Equation (1) for trade payables. The Dependent Variable is TCCGS, Trade Payables on Cost of Goods Sold. 
FINDIST_LAG is a dummy variable that is 1 if a firm is in financial distress as defined in the diploma thesis and 0 otherwise. FDYS is a variable that counts how many 
years the firm has spent in Financial Distress. WDIFSALES_SLES is the first difference in sales scaled by sales, notice that this variable is winsorized at p(0.01). 
LNASSETS is the natural log of total assets. The sample is a selected sample as described in chapter 4 of the Datastream “Europe EM” index from 1997 to 2007. The 
value of t-stats is shown in brackets. T-stats that are clustered imply robust standard errors. Coefficients with *** are significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10% in a 
two-tails test. Model 1 and 2 are company fixed effects models. Model 3 is a random effects model. Model 4 to 9 are the main regressions with country and industry fixed 
effects. Model 10 to 13 are pooled OLS models. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
VARIABLES TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 
findist_lag 23.85 22.46 28.31 45.69** 46.60** 45.69*** 39.13* 38.54* 39.13*** 47.13** 47.13*** 39.42* 39.42*** 
 
(1.236) (1.076) (1.539) (2.405) (2.475) (3.286) (1.718) (1.713) (3.670) (1.995) (3.408) (1.907) (3.665) 
wdifsales_sles 10.54 11.86 10.26 8.332 10.39 8.332 9.971 11.41 9.971 9.923 9.923 11.36 11.36 
 
(1.022) (1.116) (1.040) (0.796) (0.999) (0.532) (0.924) (1.063) (0.605) (0.759) (0.716) (0.833) (0.766) 
fdys 
 
4.023 
    
7.470 8.234 7.470 
  
8.293 8.293 
  
(0.407) 
    
(0.734) (0.822) (0.970) 
  
(1.244) (1.178) 
lnassets 
         
2.345 2.345 2.284 2.284 
          
(0.870) (0.846) (0.843) (0.817) 
Constant 91.75*** 91.14*** 95.96*** 91.29*** 90.98*** 91.29*** 90.62*** 90.40*** 90.62*** 41.28 41.28 41.91 41.91 
  (27.76) (27.04) (11.86) (24.08) (24.46) (9.516) (23.69) (24.06) (9.522) (0.707) (0.743) (0.713) (0.745) 
Observations 1528 1517 1528 1528 1528 1528 1517 1517 1517 1528 1528 1517 1517 
F test 1.205 0.926 
 
3.368 3.733 8.149 2.657 2.831 10.59 2.810 12.93 2.356 33.02 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 . 0.004 0.057 0.004 0.005 0.056 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 
Prob >F 0.0425 0.741 
 
0.0347 0.0241 0.00450 0.0470 0.0372 0.000673 0.0410 0.000254 0.0556 5.45e-07 
Number of company 177 177 177 
          
Adjusted R-squared -0.130 -0.132               0.00350 0.00350 0.00361 0.00361 
Model Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
Sub-sample French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms 
absorb company company 
 
country industry country country industry country 
    
cluster           industry     industry company industry company industry 
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Table 10: Substitution Effect between TC and FD in France 
This table shows the result of the estimation of Equation (1).  The Dependent Variables are TRCA, Trade Payables on Total Assets, TRCE, Trade Payables on 
Shareholder‟s Equity, and TCFD, Trade Payables on Financial Debt.  FINDIST_LAG is a dummy variable that is 1 if a firm is in financial distress as defined in the 
diploma thesis and 0 otherwise.  WDIFSALES_SLES is the first difference in sales scaled by sales, notice that this variable is winsorized at p(0.01). LNASSETS is the 
natural log of total assets.  The sample is a selected sample as described in chapter 4 of the Datastream “Europe EM” index from 1997 to 2007. The value of t-stats is 
shown in brackets. T-stats that are clustered imply robust standard errors. Coefficients with *** are significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10% in a two-tails test. 
Model 1, 6 and 11 are company fixed effects models. Model 2, 7 and 12 are random effects models. Model 3, 4, 8, 9, 13 and 14 are the main regressions with country and 
industry fixed effects. Model 5, 10 and 15 are pooled OLS models. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCE TRCE TRCE TRCE TRCE TCFD TCFD TCFD TCFD TCFD 
findist_lag 0.00245 0.000516 -0.0268** -0.00650 -0.0137 2.418 1.799 1.799 1.731 1.910 -4.287 -4.139 0.683 3.801 5.321 
 
(0.342) (0.0731) (-2.257) (-0.579) (-0.753) (1.556) (1.554) (1.554) (1.464) (0.996) (-0.247) (-0.241) (0.0238) (0.132) (0.356) 
wdifsales_sles 0.00259 0.00254 0.00580 0.0160** 0.00998 0.972 0.0855 0.0855 0.171 0.105 0.906 0.789 -3.219 -9.206 -1.272 
 
(0.699) (0.692) (0.835) (2.434) (1.088) (1.210) (0.126) (0.126) (0.247) (0.266) (0.0999) (0.0875) (-0.187) (-0.536) (-0.169) 
lnsales 
    
0.00626** 
    
0.0405 
    
2.604 
     
(2.162) 
    
(0.224) 
    
(0.473) 
Constant 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.145*** 0.0145 0.238 0.388 0.388 0.379 -0.469 18.89*** 35.40 19.25*** 19.94*** -36.01 
 
(117.7) (22.61) (56.77) (59.98) (0.239) (0.883) (1.533) (1.533) (1.488) (-0.131) (6.275) (1.415) (3.052) (3.210) (-0.332) 
Observations 1543 1543 1543 1543 1542 1543 1543 1543 1543 1542 1503 1503 1503 1503 1502 
Adjusted R-squared -0.132 
   
0.0170 -0.129 
   
-0.000228 -0.136 
   
-0.00150 
Number of company 179 179 
   
179 179 
   
179 179 
   
F test 0.289 
 
2.735 3.032 2.171 1.830 
 
1.247 1.141 1.750 0.0382 
 
0.0175 0.150 0.214 
Prob >F 1.000 
 
0.0652 0.0485 0.0931 2.59e-09 
 
0.288 0.320 0.159 1.000 
 
0.983 0.861 0.887 
R-squared 0.000 . 0.004 0.149 0.019 0.003 . 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.000 . 0.000 0.047 0.000 
Model Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Eff. Random Eff. Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS 
Sub-sample French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms French firms 
absorb company 
 
country industry 
 
company 
 
country industry 
 
company 
 
country industry 
 
cluster         company         company         company 
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4.4.1 Results and Interpretation 
 
The median value of TCCGS360 for French firms is 71.3 days and 
shows that the amount of purchases financed by trade credit is higher in 
France than in Europe and the US.
53
 This result is in line with the literature. 
Table 9 shows R
2‟s between 0.2 % and 5.6 % and are higher than the 
received values in previous estimations (see Table 5). This indicates that the 
models of the US apply better for France than for the whole sample of the 
European Monetary Union. However, the results are still not very 
meaningful. Moreover, differently to Table 5, Table 9 shows only positive 
and mainly significant coefficients. For example in the models (4) (5) and 
(6) the coefficient on findist_lag shows that French firms in financial 
distress take about 46 days more trade credit relatively to healthy firms. 
Note that for the EMU (Table 5) this study reports 71 days and Preve (2004) 
reports for the US 5.2 days. 
The result suggests that French firms in financial distress use much 
more trade credit than US firms but less than the average of the European 
Monetary Union. However, the median value of TCCGS360 showing the 
amount of purchases financed by trade credit for the whole sample (healthy 
and distressed firms jointly) implies that France uses more trade credit than 
the EMU and the US. In other words, French firms use more trade credit 
compared to the US and EMU in general. However, in the case of financial 
distress French firms use less trade credit than the EMU but still more than 
in the US. 
Next the substitution effect in France is covered. Table 10 shows 
nearly no significant coefficients on findist_lag and R
2‟s are close to zero. 
This indicates that the model of Preve (2004) for the US does not apply for 
French firms to measure the substitution effect.  
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 Preve (2004) reports for the US 39.3 days and section 3.2 of this study reports 59.5 days 
for the EMU. 
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5. Empirical Analysis of the Extension model 
 
In this chapter the firm size is used as a characteristic to measure the 
effect of financial distress on trade credit as well as the substitution effect 
between trade credit and other sources of financing. Comparisons will be 
made with Preve (2004) and other implications of the literature. 
Unfortunately from balance sheet data the price respectively the 
terms of trade credit that would better allow estimating its demand cannot 
be observed. Hence, only a reduced form for the quantity of trade credit 
outstanding at firm level can be estimated. Because of this limitation Preve 
(2004) uses additionally firm characteristics that according to trade credit 
theories should explain the cross sectional variations in the data to get 
information about the response of trade credit to financial distress. 
Like Preve (2004), the first equation (1) is estimated on different 
sub-groups of data (large and small firms) and then specific characteristics 
under study with the dummy identifying firms in financial distress are used. 
Hence this section studies the importance of size (relatively large firms and 
relatively small firms) to the use of trade credit during financial distress. 
Additionally, Preve (2004) studies retailers (theory of deployable 
assets as collateral for supplier), manufacturing firms (theory of ability to 
repossess and resell the goods) and the asymmetry in the cost of assessing 
the creditworthiness of the buyer (for this he uses smaller firms and 
alternatively R&D and selling and general expenses as a proxy for the 
asymmetry in the cost of evaluating firms). Although further improvements 
of the model by the use of additional variables may be fruitful this study 
concentrates on the estimation of equation (1) and its extension with an 
alternative specification of size in equation (2). Anyway the use of size 
variables already can shed some light on the reasons that drive the reduced 
forms found when estimating equation (1). 
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5.1 Using the firm size to measure the effect of FD on TC 
 
This model uses firm characteristics to explain firm‟s trade credit 
response to financial distress. First equation (1) is estimated on different 
sub-groups of data, i.e. relatively large and small firms and the whole 
TROUBLE sample (large and small firms combined). Secondly, specific 
characteristics and dummies (pre_large_s and findist_lag_pre_large_s) are 
used to identify firms in financial distress. This specification brings out the 
slope of the linear relation between financial distress and trade credit. The 
estimating equation for this is: 
 
TCit = γi + β1*FINDIST_LAGit + β2*Cit +  
β3*(FINDIST_LAG*C)it + β4 *Xit + εit  (2) 
 
C is a variable that captures firm or industry characteristics like firm 
size. It enters the model alone and in an interaction term with 
FINDIST_LAG. As a first step a firm is considered to be large if its sales 
are bigger than the median of its industry. Note that the median and the size 
are determined for each year individually. Note that the dummy C is 
calculated as the value of the last year before entering into financial distress 
(i.e. TIMELINE -1). 
5.2 The importance of the size and market power  
 
In this section first the trade credit of large and small firms in 
financial distress are compared. Larger firms are assumed to have better 
management and corporate governance. This enables to generate more 
reliable information and to get better access to bank financing. According to 
existing literature on trade credit it is predicted that larger firms use less 
trade credit from their suppliers.
54
 Since trade credit is more expensive than 
for example bank credit it is expected that firms use the latter if it is 
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 See Petersen and Rajan (1995, 1997), Preve (2004), Frank and Maksimovic (2005) and 
Cunat (2007) among others. 
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available. Extending this intuition it can be expected that larger firms use 
less trade credit from suppliers when they are in financial distress. 
The dataset is divided into large and small firms. Firms are 
considered as large if their sales are larger or equal to the median of their 
industry in any year. The auxiliary variable LARGE_S is used to separate 
the sample and consequently equation (1) is estimated on both sub-samples. 
The fact that financial distress may affect the size and, hence, the 
market power of the firm, there may be some concern in the interpretation of 
the results. To circumvent this potential criticism (like Preve (2004)), the 
size of the firm is computed alternatively at the last pre-financial distress 
period (at Timeline = -1) which generates the dummy variables pre_large_s 
and findist_lag_pre_large_s.
55
 Pre_large_s is 1 if the firm was large at the 
pre-financial distress time, and 0 otherwise. The dummy is used alone and 
interacted with findist_lag in the estimation of equation (2). Notice that by 
construction this model only considers any company that will enter into 
financial distress during the sample period, so the sample becomes 
mechanically restricted to firms with TROUBLE = 1. This specification 
allows to see the effect of financial distress on trade credit on firms that 
were large before entering in financial distress. 
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 For a definition see Table 1. 
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Table 11: Trade Credit, Financial Distress and Firm Size 
This table shows the result of the estimation of Equations (1) and (2) for trade payables dividing the sample in LARGE and SMALL firms.  The Dependent Variable is 
TCCGS, Trade Payables on Cost of Goods Sold.  FINDIST_LAG is a dummy variable that is 1 if a firm is in financial distress and 0 otherwise. WDIFSALES_SLES is 
the first difference in sales scaled by sales, notice that this variable is winsorized at p(0.01).  PRE_LARGE_S is a time invariant dummy variable that identifies firms 
whose sales were above the yearly median of its industry during Timeline=-1. FINDIST_LAG_PRE_LARGE_S is a time variant interaction term that identifies 
financially distressed firms that were large in the pre-financial distress period. The sample is a selected sample as described in chapter 4 of the Datastream “Europe EM” 
index from 1997 to 2007. The value of t-stats is shown in brackets. T-stats that are clustered imply robust standard errors. Coefficients with *** are significant at 1% 
level, ** at 5%, and * at 10% in a two-tails test. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
VARIABLES TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 
findist_lag -7.634 100.7*** 90.66*** 91.43* -75.51*** 22.38 -0.0339 22.56* -63.52* -5.108 -15.24 60.72* -7.978 
 
(-0.299) (2.931) (2.611) (1.734) (-2.595) (0.884) (-0.00129) (1.723) (-1.961) (-0.165) (-0.489) (1.735) (-0.381) 
wdifsales_sles 3.607 38.03** 38.31** 45.26 -37.03** -2.621 -13.04 2.983 -1.540 22.75 11.51 22.75 20.53 
 
(0.264) (2.010) (2.012) (1.579) (-2.299) (-0.166) (-0.803) (0.248) (-0.0987) (1.485) (0.739) (0.975) (0.864) 
findist_lag_pre_large_s 
        
54.60 100.4*** 99.45*** 
 
113.4* 
         
(1.303) (2.656) (2.624) 
 
(1.942) 
pre_large_s 
           
13.41 -15.32 
            
(0.544) (-0.634) 
Constant 107.0*** 96.02*** 96.48*** 95.31*** 107.4*** 94.84*** 98.11*** 93.94*** 133.9*** 107.1*** 112.2*** 97.42*** 115.9*** 
 
(21.17) (11.88) (11.90) (11.18) (15.59) (13.29) (13.50) (9.424) (13.36) (9.868) (10.22) (4.822) (5.206) 
Observations 5385 5385 5385 5385 1886 1886 1886 1886 1620 1620 1620 1620 1620 
Number of company 667 
   
213 
   
205 
    
R-squared 0.000 0.020 0.018 0.003 0.007 0.042 0.019 0.000 0.003 0.046 0.036 0.007 0.011 
Prob >F 1.000 0.000899 0.00265 0.00519 0 0.673 0.724 0.227 0.00290 0.000594 0.00695 0.0163 0.0270 
F test 0.0808 7.023 5.939 5.303 6.006 0.396 0.323 1.493 1.321 5.819 4.058 3.508 2.800 
Adjusted R-squared -0.142 
  
0.00227 -0.120 
  
-0.000612 -0.143 
  
0.00529 0.00882 
Model Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
Sub-sample Large Firms Large Firms Large Firms Large Firms Small Firms Small Firms Small Firms Small Firms Trouble Firms Trouble Firms Trouble Firms Trouble Firms Trouble Firms 
absorb company country industry 
 
company country industry 
 
company country industry 
  
cluster       company       company       company company 
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Table 12: TC, FD and Firm Size with 380 % criteria 
This table shows the result of the estimation of Equations (1) and (2) for trade payables dividing the sample in LARGE and SMALL firms.  The Dependent Variable is 
TCCGS, Trade Payables on Cost of Goods Sold.  FINDIST_LAG is a dummy variable that is 1 if a firm is in financial distress and 0 otherwise, notice that for this table 
a 380 % criteria instead of the 80 % standard definition from chapter 3.1 is used in order to get a similar percentage of firms in financial distress as Preve (2004). 
WDIFSALES_SLES is the first difference in sales scaled by sales, notice that this variable is winsorized at p(0.01).  PRE_LARGE_S is a time invariant dummy 
variable that identifies firms whose sales were above the yearly median of its industry during Timeline=-1. FINDIST_LAG_PRE_LARGE_S is a time variant 
interaction term that identifies financially distressed firms that were large in the pre-financial distress period. The sample is a selected sample as described in chapter 4 of 
the Datastream “Europe EM” index from 1997 to 2007. The value of t-stats is shown in brackets. T-stats that are clustered imply robust standard errors. Coefficients with 
*** are significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10% in a two-tails test. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
VARIABLES TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 TCCGS360 
findist_lag 20.25 61.93*** 64.97*** 67.47** -62.21*** 16.36 15.04 26.67** -41.94 -23.05 13.60 43.58* 3.593 
 
(1.293) (3.111) (3.277) (2.077) (-2.783) (0.909) (0.823) (2.238) (-1.464) (-0.712) (0.421) (1.955) (0.230) 
wdifsales_sles 4.701 42.39** 41.20** 48.70* -39.46** -2.359 -13.47 2.846 -6.535 35.70 31.79 42.71* 41.33* 
 
(0.344) (2.252) (2.172) (1.819) (-2.448) (-0.149) (-0.830) (0.238) (-0.405) (1.599) (1.411) (1.768) (1.739) 
findist_lag_pre_large_s 
        
66.67* 95.65** 46.37 
 
66.96* 
         
(1.845) (2.440) (1.182) 
 
(1.748) 
pre_large_s 
           
21.59 -1.846 
            
(0.743) (-0.0801) 
Constant 103.0*** 89.97*** 89.66*** 88.03*** 112.7*** 93.67*** 95.65*** 91.12*** 126.9*** 107.6*** 105.4*** 88.59*** 104.3*** 
 
(18.40) (10.47) (10.42) (16.55) (14.79) (12.46) (12.50) (8.515) (13.30) (7.681) (7.515) (5.218) (6.333) 
Observations 5385 5385 5385 5385 1886 1886 1886 1886 3680 3680 3680 3680 3680 
Prob >F 0.989 0.000522 0.000374 0.0932 0 0.659 0.516 0.0770 0.00948 0.0137 0.0918 0.00779 0.0158 
Number of company 667 
   
213 
   
450 
    
F test 0.873 7.569 7.902 2.381 6.511 0.418 0.662 2.595 1.176 3.558 2.150 4.010 3.088 
R-squared 0.000 0.020 0.018 0.003 0.008 0.042 0.019 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.016 0.002 0.003 
Adjusted R-squared -0.141 
  
0.00309 -0.119 
  
0.000182 -0.139 
  
0.00130 0.00155 
Model Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
Sub-sample Large Firms Large Firms Large Firms Large Firms Small Firms Small Firms Small Firms Small Firms Trouble Firms Trouble Firms Trouble Firms Trouble Firms Trouble Firms 
absorb company country industry 
 
company country industry 
 
company country industry 
  
cluster       company       company       company company 
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5.2.1 Results and Interpretation 
 
Tables 11 and 12 show the results whereas below, results and 
interpretations are provided. R
2‟s are very low (between 0 % and 4.6 %) 
hence, the extension models may be not better than those of presented in 
Chapter 4. However, the country and industry fixed effects models and the 
pooled OLS model suggest that large firms use significantly more trade 
credit from suppliers during financial distress. In comparison, Preve (2004) 
found a contradicting result. Note that the sub-sample of small firms shows 
few significant coefficients for findist_lag. Further, the coefficient for the 
company fixed effects model (5) is negative and significant (-75.5) while the 
coefficient for the pooled OLS model (8) with company cluster is positive 
and significant (22.6). Hence, the results show no clear tendency. Notice 
that the size and the statistically significance of the coefficients are higher in 
the case of large firms.  
However, the pooled OLS models of Table 9 suggest that large firms 
delay their payment to suppliers by 91.4 days while smaller ones by 22.6 
days during financial distress. Hence, the company fixed effects model 
suggests that small firms use significantly less trade credit during financial 
distress than large firms. In detail, the difference suggests that large firms 
delay their payment 58.8 days more than small firms in financial distress. 
This result is not in line with existing trade credit theories. As already 
mentioned in Chapter 4 this may be due to unknown factors that correlate 
with findist_lag. 
The results in Table 11 and 12 are an indication that the size of the 
firm plays an important role in the use of trade credit in financial distress. It 
could be argued, however, that size can be affected by financial distress 
because, as shown in the literature, firms entering into financial distress tend 
to reduce their size as a consequence of a decrease in sales, market share or 
assets. In other words, the fact that financial distress may affect the size of 
the firm could cause some concern in the interpretation of the results. In 
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order to prevent this potential criticism, similar to Preve (2004) a different 
specification to study the effect of size is used. 
The results as presented in columns 9 to 13 of Table 11, are models 
with “troubled” firms (large and small ones). The pooled OLS model (12) 
shows a positive significant coefficient on findist_lag whereas the company 
fixed effects model shows a negative significant coefficient. In contrast to 
Preve (2004) the coefficients of the interaction term pre_large_s and 
findist_lag_pre_large_s are positive and mainly statistically significant in 
both the fixed effects and the pooled OLS, suggesting that larger firms in 
financial distress use more trade credit than smaller firms. More specifically, 
the country fixed effects model (10) indicates that large firms in financial 
distress take 100.4 days longer than smaller ones to repay their suppliers. 
The case of the pooled OLS model (13) shows this difference to be around 
113.4 days. The coefficients on pre_large_s are not significant, hence the 
variable cannot give information about how many more days distressed 
large firms need to repay suppliers compared to smaller ones. Note that a 
positive significant coefficient on pre_large_s in the model (12) would 
suggest how many more days large firms need to repay suppliers than 
smaller ones during normal non-financial distress times. 
Therefore, the results are not in line with the literature. Suggesting 
that smaller firms prefer to choose financing from financial creditor (if 
available) rather than trying to obtain longer payment terms from suppliers. 
5.3 The substitution effect  
 
Additionally, the effect of size by the use of the pre-financial distress 
variables on the substitution effect between trade credit and other sources of 
capital is tested. Consequently, equation (2) is applied on the sample. As in 
Chapter 4, TRCA is examined first showing the participation of trade 
payables in the capital structure. Note again that the coefficients of 
findist_lag on TCFD and TRCE show the relative change of trade payables 
with respect to long term debt and equity respectively. Furthermore, the use 
of the dummies pre_large_s and findist_lag_pre_large_s allows to see the 
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effect of financial distress on firms that were large before entering into 
financial distress. 
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Table 13: Substitution Effect and Firm Size 
This table shows the result of the estimation of Equation (2) for trade payables.  The Dependent Variables are TRCA Trade Payables on Total Assets, TRCE, Trade 
Payables on Shareholder‟s Equity, and TCFD, Trade Payables on Financial Debt.  FINDIST_LAG is a dummy variable that is 1 if a firm is in financial distress and 0 
otherwise. WDIFSALES_SLES is the first difference in sales scaled by sales. PRE_LARGE_S is a time invariant dummy variable that identifies firms whose sales were 
above the yearly median of its industry during Timeline=-1. FINDIST_LAG_PRE_LARGE_S is a time variant interaction term that identifies financially distressed 
firms that were large in the pre-financial distress period. The sample is a selected sample as described in chapter 4 of the Datastream “Europe EM” index from 1997 to 
2007. The value of t-stats is shown in brackets. T-stats that are clustered imply robust standard errors. Coefficients with *** are significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 
10% in a two-tails test. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCE TRCE TRCE TRCE TRCE TCFD TCFD TCFD TCFD TCFD 
findist_lag 0.00953** 0.00826** -0.0101 0.00589 -0.00395 3.668*** 4.379*** 4.489*** 4.540*** 4.463 -25.18 -24.05 -14.89 -11.92 -9.479 
 
(2.288) (2.012) (-1.522) (0.900) (-0.275) (4.044) (6.041) (6.480) (6.526) (1.181) (-0.887) (-0.892) (-0.569) (-0.454) (-1.124) 
pre_large_s 
    
0.0162* 
    
0.130 
    
31.86 
     
(1.821) 
    
(1.622) 
    
(1.388) 
findist_lag_pre_large_s -4.74e-05 0.000497 0.0191** 0.00919 -0.00547 -2.948** -3.860*** -3.975*** -3.938*** -4.067 -14.86 -11.65 14.67 1.689 -22.63 
 
(-0.00878) (0.0936) (2.218) (1.089) (-0.327) (-2.510) (-4.123) (-4.429) (-4.393) (-1.053) (-0.416) (-0.343) (0.441) (0.0509) (-0.755) 
wdifsales_sles 0.00389*** 0.00385*** 0.00391 0.00766*** 0.00376 0.0369 0.238 0.266 0.211 0.272 11.11 13.12 19.22** 18.18* 20.62 
 
(2.739) (2.742) (1.518) (3.024) (1.162) (0.119) (0.878) (0.993) (0.782) (0.807) (1.212) (1.479) (1.981) (1.868) (1.106) 
Constant 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.460*** 0.427*** 0.410*** 0.415*** 0.395*** 24.27*** 36.61*** 21.48*** 21.90*** 17.76*** 
 
(224.0) (44.56) (110.8) (112.0) (39.69) (3.799) (3.082) (3.492) (3.528) (4.861) (6.980) (3.463) (5.238) (5.339) (2.939) 
Observations 7306 7306 7306 7306 7306 7307 7307 7307 7307 7307 6775 6775 6775 6775 6775 
Number of company 883 883 
   
883 883 
   
858 858 
   
R-squared 0.003 . 0.061 0.102 0.004 0.003 . 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.001 . 0.004 0.008 0.002 
F test 6.716 
 
2.549 6.192 1.414 5.762 
 
14.70 14.71 1.356 1.891 
 
1.406 1.246 0.780 
Adjusted R-squared -0.134 
   
0.00299 -0.135 
   
0.00545 -0.144 
   
0.00117 
Prob >F 0   0.0540 0.000338 0.227 0   1.54e-09 1.51e-09 0.248 0   0.239 0.291 0.538 
Model Fixed Eff. Random Effects Fixed Eff. Fixed Eff. Pooled OLS Fixed Eff. Random Effects Fixed Eff. Fixed Eff. Pooled OLS Fixed Eff. Random Effects Fixed Eff. Fixed Eff. Pooled OLS 
absorb company country country industry 
 
company country country industry 
 
company country country industry 
 
cluster         company         company         company 
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Table 14: Substitution Effect and Firm Size with 380 % criteria 
This table shows the result of the estimation of Equation (2) for trade payables.  The Dependent Variables are TRCA Trade Payables on Total Assets, TRCE, Trade 
Payables on Shareholder‟s Equity, and TCFD, Trade Payables on Financial Debt.  FINDIST_LAG is a dummy variable that is 1 if a firm is in financial distress and 0 
otherwise, notice that for this table a 380 % criteria instead of the 80 % standard definition from chapter 3.1 is used in order to get a similar percentage of firms in 
financial distress as Preve (2004).  WDIFSALES_SLES is the first difference in sales scaled by sales, , notice that this variable is winorized at p(0.01). PRE_LARGE_S 
is a time invariant dummy variable that identifies firms whose sales were above the yearly median of its industry during Timeline=-1. FINDIST_LAG_PRE_LARGE_S 
is a time variant interaction term that identifies financially distressed firms that were large in the pre-financial distress period. The sample is a selected sample as 
described in chapter 4 of the Datastream “Europe EM” index from 1997 to 2007. The value of t-stats is shown in brackets. T-stats that are clustered imply robust standard 
errors. Coefficients with *** are significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10% in a two-tails test. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCA TRCE TRCE TRCE TRCE TRCE TCFD TCFD TCFD TCFD TCFD 
findist_lag 0.00210 0.00230 0.00235 0.0138*** 0.0102 1.887*** 1.903*** 1.874*** 1.882*** 1.826 -14.82 -17.03 -22.35 -13.17 -19.50*** 
 
(0.738) (0.826) (0.595) (3.570) (1.019) (3.042) (4.278) (4.548) (4.585) (1.447) (-0.812) (-0.999) (-1.542) (-0.913) (-2.597) 
pre_large_s 
    
0.00822 
    
-0.0434 
    
-3.310 
     
(1.269) 
    
(-0.214) 
    
(-0.266) 
findist_lag_pre_large_s 0.00107 0.000358 -0.00246 -0.0108** -0.0173 -1.316* -1.429** -1.426*** -1.384*** -1.343 1.646 1.291 5.666 -6.635 3.315 
 
(0.298) (0.102) (-0.485) (-2.187) (-1.533) (-1.681) (-2.527) (-2.705) (-2.632) (-1.027) (0.0726) (0.0609) (0.308) (-0.362) (0.232) 
wdifsales_sles 0.00395*** 0.00394*** 0.00420 0.00821*** 0.00419 0.0777 0.291 0.334 0.260 0.339 10.37 12.13 19.44** 18.18* 21.60 
 
(2.772) (2.796) (1.638) (3.250) (1.298) (0.251) (1.078) (1.250) (0.967) (0.892) (1.127) (1.366) (2.014) (1.875) (1.132) 
Constant 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.372*** 0.358** 0.344*** 0.350*** 0.357*** 24.94*** 37.80*** 24.39*** 24.22*** 24.88*** 
 
(201.4) (44.33) (104.3) (105.1) (34.31) (2.765) (2.440) (2.758) (2.811) (5.963) (6.402) (3.535) (5.591) (5.558) (3.131) 
Observations 7306 7306 7306 7306 7306 7307 7307 7307 7307 7307 6775 6775 6775 6775 6775 
Adjusted R-squared -0.136 
   
0.00173 -0.136 
   
0.00257 -0.145 
   
0.000650 
R-squared 0.002 . 0.061 0.103 0.002 0.002 . 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.001 . 0.005 0.008 0.001 
Prob >F 0 
 
0.385 2.72e-05 0.280 0 
 
4.11e-05 4.21e-05 0.0694 0.281 
 
0.0539 0.0957 0.0371 
F test 3.292 
 
1.014 7.953 1.269 3.554 
 
7.666 7.650 2.181 1.030 
 
2.551 2.118 2.563 
Number of company 883 883       883 883       858 858       
Model Fixed Eff. Random Effects Fixed Eff. Fixed Eff. Pooled OLS Fixed Eff. Random Effects Fixed Eff. Fixed Eff. Pooled OLS Fixed Eff. Random Effects Fixed Eff. Fixed Eff. Pooled OLS 
absorb company country country industry 
 
company country country industry 
 
company country country industry 
 
cluster         company         company         company 
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5.3.1 Results and Interpretation 
 
The pooled OLS models have very low explanatory power as shown 
by R
2‟s (0.1 % to 10.2 %).56 Furthermore, the results are ambiguous because 
findist_lag_pre_large_s shows few significant coefficients, depending on 
which model and cluster option is applied. The negative and significant 
coefficient for the interaction term in the model using TRCE as the 
dependent variable suggests that larger firms in financial distress use less 
trade credit than smaller firms confirming the results of Preve (2004). This 
implies that smaller firms substitute more equity with trade credit than 
larger firms during financial distress. Note that only models 6, 7, 8 and 9 
present significant coefficients on findist_lag and the interaction term. 
However, the positive and significant coefficients on findist_lag suggest that 
the level of trade payables increases faster than the denominator (book value 
of equity) in the case of large distressed firms. A more likely interpretation 
is that during financial distress the level of trade payables decreases less 
than the book value of equity since the book value of equity gets reduced 
when firms lose money. 
Examining the substitution of long term debt (TCFD) and the 
participation of trade payables on the capital structure (TRCA) provides no 
significant coefficients. Hence, the models do not give information on 
whether there is some substitution between trade credit and long term debt 
as well as about the relation of trade credit and assets when firms are in 
financial distress. This shows that the models do not apply well. 
In sum, the result using size as a firm characteristic suggests that 
firms that are able to get some financing from issuing stock tend to use it 
before relying on trade credit. A possible reason for preferring equity is 
because it is cheaper or the fact that it does not involve any obligation for 
repayment. Concluding, the result only partly confirms that firms consider 
trade credit to be lower in the pecking order of financing.  
                                                 
56
 The models of Preve (2004) show R
2‟s between 6 % and 14 %. 
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6. Conclusion, Implication, Remarks and Summary 
 
The first part of this diploma thesis gave some insights on trade 
credit theories, benefits and aspects. It has been shown that the supply and 
the use of trade credit is likely to improve liquidity, reduce information 
asymmetry and facilitate monitoring, it allows to price discriminate and it 
implies insurance and signaling as well as product quality aspects among the 
most important ones. However, trade credit has also drawbacks and costs 
caused by financial distress and the possibility of default. 
In the second half some theories have been tested. A main task was 
to apply the models of Preve (2004), who used US firms, on a sample of 
European Monetary Union firms. To reach this goal standard panel data 
analysis are applied on a sample of eleven years of European Monetary 
Union corporate data. In order to find an adequate model for the sample of 
European firms various model specifications regarding clusters and 
absorbing variables have been tested. However, all test-results show quite 
low R
2‟s as well as partly ambiguous coefficients. Hence, for the analyzed 
data no variant of his model could be empirically confirmed outright. An 
outcome is that the models of Preve (2004) for the US do not apply well for 
European Monetary Union firms. An interpretation is that the payment-
behavior between suppliers and buyers during financial distress is 
significantly different from that in Europe. The low explanatory power of 
the models and partly differing results to Preve (2004) may be caused by the 
accounting systems, the use of credit insurers and a different creditor 
protection between the US and the European Monetary Union as well as 
between European countries. A further reason may be the financial structure 
since European firms tend to be more bank-oriented whereas US firms tend 
to be more market-oriented. Last but not least, the statutory law that US 
banks are prohibited from holding equity in firms suggests better relations 
between European banks and firms.
57
,
 58
 Hence, due to the European house 
                                                 
57
 See Petersen and Rajan (1994). 
58
 Table 13 suggests that financially distressed EMU firms substitute equity with trade 
credit. 
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banking system there may be less information asymmetry but also more 
dependency between them. As a consequence, European banks may support 
EMU firms by providing financial credit even if they are in financial 
distress.
59
 This might explain the finding that financially distressed EMU 
firms increase the use of long term debt compared to trade credit. Hence, 
there are a lot of factors that may drive the results. 
 
The Results 
Examining only those models with significant coefficients on the 
main explanatory variable (findist_lag), supports the theory that firms use 
more trade credit from suppliers when they are in financial distress. 
Furthermore, Figure 10 shows that firms that are financially distressed once 
over the sample period have significantly higher levels of trade payables. 
This is in line with the trade credit literature. For example Petersen and 
Rajan (1997) showed that firms with less access to bank credit use more 
trade credit. The result confirms also that of Preve (2004) who demonstrated 
that financially distressed firms use more trade credit. 
Neglecting the low R
2‟s, this work supports the substitution effect in 
2 out of 3 regression specifications in Table 7. It shows that firms in 
financial distress significantly increase trade credit in their capital structure 
respectively that trade payables decrease less than assets and equity. An 
explanation for the finding that financially distressed EMU firms use more 
trade credit compared to equity may be the tendency that the book value of 
equity gets reduced when firms lose money. However, it cannot be 
supported that firms substitute long term debt with trade payables when they 
are in financial distress. Actually, the company fixed effects models and the 
random effects model indicate the opposite. A reason may be that firms 
prefer long term debt because it is cheaper than trade credit or that for 
example EMU banks grant relatively more credit to financially distressed 
EMU firms than suppliers of trade credit do. Furthermore, the result 
suggests that when a firm is in financial distress the costs of goods sold 
                                                 
59
 However, notice that Table 5 and the median value of TCCGS360 suggest more trade 
credit use in Europe compared to the US, even when firms are in financial distress. 
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decrease faster than trade payables. They may decrease faster due to rising 
inventory costs caused by a decrease in sales as shown in Figure 9. Finally, 
the result that financially distressed firms undergo asset sales is in line with 
the literature.
60
 
It seems that the models apply slightly better for French firms than 
for European Monetary Union firms in general. The result suggests that 
during financial distress French firms use more trade credit than US firms 
but less than the average of the EMU.
61
 Another interpretation of this is that 
French firms may receive less trade credit than other European firms 
because of a higher risk of a total loss in the case of bankruptcy of the 
debtor. For example Davydenko and Franks (2008) commented that French 
banks require more collateral than lenders elsewhere because of a creditor-
unfriendly code. In France trade creditors may substitute for bank credit but 
still grant less credit than other European firms. This may be due to the risk 
of a total loss when the trade debtor goes bankrupt. The argument holds 
especially if the delivery cannot be claimed back as an unprocessed product 
or good. Finally, the substitution effect for France cannot be explained with 
the models. 
Table 11 shows that larger European Monetary Union firms increase 
their use of supplier‟s trade credit when they are in financial distress. For 
smaller or less dominant firms the results are mixed or ambiguous. The 
company fixed effects model predicts that they use less trade credit during 
financial distress while the pooled OLS model shows the opposite. The 
latter shows a coefficient that is less pronounced than those of large firms 
which indicates that in financial distress large firms use more trade credit 
than small firms. However, note that the results of Preve (2004) and trade 
credit theories suggest that small firms use more trade credit than larger 
ones, especially when they are in financial distress. 
                                                 
60
 See for example Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994). 
61
 Notice that the median value of TCCGS360 showing the amount of purchases financed 
by trade credit during “normal” times is 71.3 days for France, 59.5 days for the EMU and 
39.3 days for the US. The time that distressed firms take longer trade credit than healthy 
firms are: 71 days in the EMU, 46 days for France and 5.2 days for the US. 
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The result that there is no tendency whether smaller or larger firms 
use more trade credit during financial distress may be due to the fact that the 
sample was selected from an index of Datastream and that its database 
solely contains companies listed on stock exchanges.
62
 Consequently, as 
EMU companies are not as often listed on stock exchanges as US firms, 
listed EMU firms might be larger on the average. Hence, the sample tends to 
contain mostly large firms which would explain the results showing no clear 
tendency for larger and smaller firms. Accordingly, when the firm size has 
no linear effect, differing results to the US sample may arise. However, 
Table 16 indicates that smaller EMU firms tend to be more frequently in 
financial distress than larger ones. 
Abstaining the low explanatory power like in all of the 
interpretations, Table 13 shows evidence that in financial distress larger 
firms use less trade credit than smaller firms confirming the results of Preve 
(2004). Furthermore, it is demonstrated that in financial distress smaller 
firms substitute more equity with trade credit than larger firms. A reason 
may be that the book value of equity decreases faster than trade payables 
since the size of the book value of equity tends to decrease during financial 
distress. Finally, the models investigating the substitution of long term debt 
(TCFD) and the participation of trade payables on the capital structure 
(TRCA) provides no significant coefficients. Hence, the substitution effect 
is not explained well with the models. However, the result suggests that 
firms that are able to get alternative sources of finance like equity from 
issuing stock tend to use it before relying on trade credit. 
 
In sum, this paper has shown evidence that financially distressed 
firms use more trade credit than healthy ones. Furthermore, it is shown that 
trade credit substitutes other sources of financing like equity and 
demonstrates its importance in the financially distressed firm‟s capital 
structure. An interesting outcome is that firms reduce trade credit compared 
                                                 
62
 Notice that even the whole sample (financially distressed and healthy firms) shows little 
difference in the trade credit use as the median value of TCCGS360 is 60.2 days for larger 
firms and 57.7 days for smaller firms (see Table 16). 
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to long term debt in the case of financial distress. Additionally, the result 
suggests that large and small firms use more trade credit during financial 
distress. However, there is no clear tendency whether smaller firms use 
more than larger ones. Last but not least the result tends to imply that 
compared to trade credit, long term debt comes higher and equity lower in 
the pecking order of financing. 
This thesis helps to better understand trade credit and especially the 
effect of financial distress on trade credit. It highlights the aspects but also 
the risks and costs of trade credit. Furthermore it provides insights to a 
firm‟s financing decision and the creditor to debtor behavior. Taken 
together, it is shown evidence that the models cannot be applied uncritically 
to different countries. 
To conclude, some of the main aspects of Preve (2004) could be 
confirmed. The low explanatory power of the regressions shows that in the 
European Monetary Union the amount of trade credit use is either 
considerably more random than in the US or that in the EMU other not 
considered factors may be more important. 
 
Outlook 
In order to explain cross sectional variations, the models of Chapter 
5 use firm and industry characteristics like relative firm size. Making the 
results more robust it would be interesting to test alternative definitions of 
financial distress. For example it is possible to classify for high and low 
book to market securities. When market values of debt and equity are lower 
than their book values, firms may be in financial distress. Alternatively, they 
may be categorized as in financial distress when the book to market value 
rises significantly between years. 
Preve (2004) uses additionally further definitions of financial 
distress, for example the dummy variable DISTIND for exogenous shocks 
respectively for firms whose industry is in distress. Using “default” as an 
alternative dummy variable would also be interesting. For example Preve 
(2004) defines the variable “default” for firms whose credit rating is 
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categorized as in Default by Standard & Poor‟s. A firm‟s leverage as a 
determinant of financial distress would be very illuminative as well, for 
example using it as a dummy variable (high or low leverage) to determine 
the trade credit use respectively the effect of an industry shock on highly 
levered firms. The leverage of a firm should have a significant influence on 
financial distress as Andrade and Kaplan (1988) found that high leverage is 
the primary cause. Petersen and Rajan (1997) found that firms with less 
access to financial credit use more trade credit. This would be the case for 
highly leveraged firms as they have to pay higher risk premiums and have in 
general less access to bank credit. 
Future research may show a heavier use of trade credit for the years 
2008 and 2009 due to the global financial crisis respectively the global 
recession and financial distress of banks and firms. Notice that the rising use 
of trade credit is relative to the use of bank credit because trade-creditors 
reduce their receivables during a macroeconomic crisis or exogenous shock 
as well.
63
 This prediction would be in line with Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
and the pecking order theory because firms whose internal funds are 
exhausted and whose business activity is threatened by financial distress 
will choose debt and equity as last resort. This issue of equity can easily be 
observed by investors and analysts. They further found that firms use more 
trade credit when credit from financial institutions is unavailable. This 
should apply especially here because there is a situation where financial 
debt is more difficult to obtain due to the mistrust in the interbank lending 
and low liquidity levels on the credit market. In other words, firms receive 
less bank credit and will try to substitute it with trade credit. 
Furthermore firms should tend to substitute equity and debt by using 
relatively more trade credit. The portion of assets financed by trade credit 
will rise as well. Note that macroeconomic factors may have much more 
influence on a firm‟s financial distress situation than financial distress 
through “culpa” of the firm itself or a crisis of its industry. The costs of 
financial distress will also rise for the predicted period as reported by 
                                                 
63
 See Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende (2007). 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1992). They show that financial distress is more costly 
when a firm‟s whole industry performs poorly because potential asset-
buyers who value most the distressed firm‟s assets itself have problems to 
finance the deal respectively a buyout. Hence, there is still a lot of 
interesting research outstanding, especially with respect to the current global 
financial and economic crisis. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 15: Distribution of firms along the Timeline with winsorized 
means 
This table shows the distribution of firms along the Timeline and some selected summary 
statistics.  The variables are defined in Table 1.  Nobs is the number of observation in each 
group and Freq is the Frequency.  TRCA is the average value of Trade Payables on Assets 
and TCCGS is the average value of Trade Payables on Cost of Goods Sold in each group.  
SALES(cpi) and ASSETS(cpi) in million Euro are the average value of Net Sales and 
Total Assets in each group.  Both variables are presented in constant values of Year 2005. 
Notice that this table is similar to Table 4 with the difference of winsorized variables. 
Timeline Nobs Freq TRCA TCCGS SALES(cpi) ASSETS(cpi) 
-10 6 0.26% 0.1189 0.2538 478.51 727.65 
-9 16 0.71% 0.1189 0.2538 2,552.77 1,928.02 
-8 29 1.28% 0.1505 0.2538 1,742.27 1,857.07 
-7 40 1.77% 0.1505 0.2538 2,018.60 1,847.22 
-6 80 3.53% 0.1505 0.3080 1,631.73 1,856.24 
-5 111 4.90% 0.1434 0.3564 2,391.94 3,424.71 
-4 145 6.40% 0.1418 0.2809 2,814.30 4,124.77 
-3 159 7.02% 0.1396 0.3646 2,743.63 4,221.60 
-2 172 7.59% 0.1298 0.2833 2,723.59 4,634.03 
-1 190 8.38% 0.1236 0.2538 2,656.05 5,542.33 
0 695 30.67% 0.1370 0.2596 3,234.30 5,101.32 
1 260 11.47% 0.1189 0.4199 2,958.64 4,964.37 
2 152 6.71% 0.1288 0.4751 990.69 1,625.29 
3 97 4.28% 0.1225 0.6623 344.46 761.36 
4 56 2.47% 0.1415 0.6623 270.80 727.65 
5 27 1.19% 0.1227 0.6443 270.80 727.65 
6 21 0.93% 0.1505 0.6623 270.80 727.65 
7 4 0.18% 0.1189 0.2826 270.80 727.65 
8 3 0.13% 0.1189 0.6623 270.80 727.65 
9 2 0.09% 0.1189 0.0000 270.80 727.65 
10 1 0.04% 0.1189 0.0000 270.80 727.65 
Total 2,266 100%         
TROUBLE = 0 7,689   0.1243 0.3024 4,039.67 5,081.52 
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Table 16: Levels of sales, assets and trade credit 
This table shows the levels of CPI-adjusted sales and assets in million Euro and the level of 
TCCGS360 in days for the whole sample, larger firms and smaller firms. Firms are 
considered to be large when max_large_s=1 (see Table 1). 
Median CPI-sales Larger & Smaller firms Larger firms Smaller firms 
TROUBLE = 1 204.912 724.792 50.587 
TROUBLE = 0 766.280 1,363.452 208.039 
TROUBLE = 1 & 0 639.797 1,213.578 146.501 
    Median CPI-assets Larger & Smaller firms Larger firms Smaller firms 
TROUBLE = 1 309.968 803.053 86.164 
TROUBLE = 0 827.082 1,402.438 233.807 
TROUBLE = 1 & 0 698.154 1,270.013 180.145 
    Median TCCGS360 Larger & Smaller firms Larger firms Smaller firms 
TROUBLE = 1 69.8 69.1 70.8 
TROUBLE = 0 57.1 58.3 52.6 
TROUBLE = 1 & 0 59.5 60.2 57.7 
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Table 17: Company Name list of the sample (the selected index) 
 
Nr. Type COMPANY NAME 
1 307298 A-B VASSILOPOULOS S.A. 
2 41436T A-TEC INDUSTRIES AG 
3 685120 A2A SPA 
4 749352 AALBERTS INDUSTRIES NV 
5 885354 AARDVARK INVESTMENTS S.A. 
6 917065 ABBEY PLC 
7 885095 ABENGOA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA 
8 772273 ABERTIS INFRAESTRUCTURAS 
9 688324 ACCELL GROUP NV 
10 741112 ACCIONA SA 
11 929363 ACCOR 
12 672736 ACEA SPA 
13 258572 ACEGAS-APS SPA 
14 741901 ACERINOX, S.A. 
15 755087 ACKERMANS & VAN HAAREN NV 
16 299517 ACOTEL GROUP S.P.A. 
17 539621 ACS ACTIVIDADES DE CONSTRUCCION Y SERVICIOS 
18 15222W ACTELIOS SPA 
19 866013 ADIDAS AG 
20 291599 ADLINK INTERNET MEDIA AG 
21 885560 ADOLFO DOMINGUEZ S.A. 
22 412214 AER LINGUS 
23 31133K AEROPORTO DI VENEZIA MARCO POLO - SAVE SPA 
24 36066K AEROPORTS DE PARIS 
25 682852 AES CHEMUNEX SA 
26 679622 AFC AJAX NV 
27 672548 AGFA-GEVAERT N.V. 
28 307059 AGRANA BETEILIGUNGS AG 
29 32956M AHLSTROM OYJ 
30 929286 AIR FRANCE - KLM 
31 923295 AIR LIQUIDE 
32 35785W AIR-BERLIN 
33 896674 AIXTRON AG 
34 912643 AKZO NOBEL N.V. 
35 998418 ALANHERI NV 
36 692629 ALAPIS S.A. 
37 755022 ALCATEL-LUCENT SA 
38 881832 ALES GROUPE 
39 998250 ALITALIA-LINEE AEREE ITALIANE SPA 
40 30901L ALMA MEDIA OYJ 
41 682858 ALSTOM SA 
42 951477 ALTANA AG 
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43 692445 ALTEN 
44 756882 ALTRAN TECHNOLOGIES 
45 30416C ALTRI SGPS S.A. 
46 946457 AMER SPORTS OYJ 
47 50788M AMG ADVANCED METALLURGICAL GROUP N.V. 
48 701691 AMPER, S.A. 
49 259288 AMPLIFON SPA 
50 932754 AMSTERDAM COMMODITIES NV 
51 888804 AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS N.V. 
52 929049 ANDREAE-NORIS ZAHN AG 
53 255055 ANDRITZ AG 
54 35619C ANSALDO STS SPA 
55 27685F ANTENA 3 DE TELEVISION, S.A. 
56 36095R ANTICHI PELLETTIERI SPA 
57 301773 ARCADIS NV 
58 922888 ARCANDOR AG 
59 756190 ARCELOR RODANGE S.A. 
60 899069 ARCELORMITTAL 
61 307655 AREVA 
62 35720C ARKEMA GROUP 
63 741783 ARNOLDO MONDADORI EDITORE SPA 
64 51129T ARSEUS NV 
65 41474T ASCOPIAVE SPA 
66 888051 ASM INTERNATIONAL NV 
67 152001 ASML HOLDING NV 
68 25590M ASTALDI 
69 688826 AT&S AUSTRIA TECHNOLOGIE & SYSTEMTECHNIK AG 
70 276727 ATHENS WATER SUPPLY & SEWERAGE SA 
71 685756 ATLANTIA SPA 
72 740622 ATOS ORIGIN SA 
73 308895 ATTICA HOLDINGS S.A. 
74 922819 AUDI AG 
75 673926 AUDIKA 
76 772803 AUSTRIAN AIRLINES AG 
77 892360 AUTOGRILL SOCIETA PER AZIONI 
78 29786H AUTOROUTES PARIS RHIN RHONE 
79 933327 AUTOSTRADA TORINO-MILANO SPA 
80 504846 AVANZIT SA 
81 702300 AXEL SPRINGER VERLAG AG 
82 772790 AZKOYEN, S.A. 
83 142433 BALLAST NEDAM N.V. 
84 729569 BARCO NV 
85 892258 BARON DE LEY S.A. 
86 904881 BASF SE 
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87 932777 BATENBURG BEHEER N.V. 
88 36197U BAUER AG 
89 905243 BAYER AG 
90 504700 BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
91 775017 BAYWA AG 
92 866096 BE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRIES N.V. 
93 290298 BECHTLE AG 
94 681791 BEFESA MEDIO AMBIENTE SA 
95 929048 BEIERSDORF AG 
96 932532 BEKAERT S.A. 
97 27597M BELGACOM SA 
98 749880 BENETEAU 
99 729164 BENETTON GROUP SPA 
100 882292 BERTRANDT AG 
101 896382 BERU AG 
102 882832 BETER BED HOLDING NV 
103 259266 BIESSE SPA 
104 772756 BIJOU BRIGITTE MODISCHE ACCESSOIRES AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
105 929080 BILFINGER BERGER AG 
106 29169X BIOMERIEUX SA 
107 756551 BIOTEST AG 
108 698258 BLUE FOX ENTERPRISES N.V. 
109 143668 BOEHLER-UDDEHOLM AG 
110 755323 BOIRON SA 
111 885058 BOIZEL, CHANOINE, CHAMPAGNE 
112 997966 BOLLORE 
113 682921 BONDUELLE 
114 992701 BONGRAIN SOCIETE ANONYME 
115 685788 BOURBON 
116 923500 BOUYGUES SA 
117 143980 BREMBO SPA 
118 866704 BRICORAMA SA 
119 890858 BRISA-AUTO ESTRADAS DE PORTUGAL, S.A. 
120 897486 BRUNEL INTERNATIONAL N.V. 
121 135487 BULGARI SOCIETA PER AZIONI 
122 51185D BUREAU VERITAS SA 
123 779067 BUZZI UNICEM SPA 
124 288910 BWIN INTERACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT AG 
125 307555 BWT AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
126 35785U C A T OIL AG 
127 28961U C&C GROUP 
128 289329 CALTAGIRONE EDITORE SPA 
129 505249 CALTAGIRONE SPA 
130 289277 CAMAIEU 
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131 505951 CAMFIN SPA 
132 772879 CAMPOFRIO ALIMENTACION SA 
133 756920 CANAL+ 
134 702043 CAPGEMINI S.A. 
135 936590 CARBONE-LORRAINE 
136 31116C CARGOTEC CORPORATION 
137 287936 CARL ZEISS MEDITEC AG 
138 922029 CARREFOUR S.A. 
139 729105 CASINO, GUICHARD-PERRACHON ET CIE 
140 997826 CEGEDEL-COMPAGNIE GRAND-DUCALE D'ELECTRICITE DU LUXEMBOURG 
141 143693 CEGEDIM 
142 951741 CELESIO AG 
143 929377 CEMENTIR HOLDING S.P.A. 
144 307702 CEMENTOS PORTLAND VALDERRIVAS SA 
145 51163N CENTROTHERM PHOTOVOLTAICS AG 
146 929549 CEPSA - COMPANIA ESPANOLA DE PETROLEOS, S.A. 
147 539616 CHRISTIAN DIOR 
148 143260 CIA LEVANTINA DE EDIFICACION Y OBRAS PUB 
149 929412 CICCOLELLA SPA 
150 892349 CIE AUTOMOTIVE SA 
151 929173 CIMENTS FRANCAIS 
152 142802 CIMPOR - CIMENTOS DE PORTUGAL SGPS SA 
153 29716D CINTRA CONCESIONEX DE INFRAESTRUCTURAS DE TRANSPORTE SA 
154 307631 CIPAN-CIA IND. PRODUTORA DE ANTIBIOTICOS 
155 905397 CLARINS 
156 50375D CLINICA BAVIERA SA 
157 923814 CLUB MEDITERRANEE SA 
158 307612 COCA-COLA HELLENIC BOTTLING COMPANY S.A. 
159 51205X CODERE, S. A. 
160 719620 COFIDE - COMPAGNIA FINANZIARIA DE BENEDETTI S.P.A. 
161 673252 COFINA SGPS, SA 
162 929247 COLAS S.A. 
163 950997 COLRUYT 
164 929336 COMPAGNIE D'ENTREPRISES CFE S.A. 
165 143369 COMPAGNIE DES ALPES 
166 998054 COMPAGNIE GENERALE DE GEOPHYSIQUE- VERITAS 
167 912397 COMPAGNIE GENERALE DES ETABLISSEMENTS MICHELIN 
168 933357 COMPAGNIE INDUSTRIALI RIUNITE SPA 
169 756159 COMPAGNIE INTERNATIONALE DE CULTURES SA 
170 929356 COMPAGNIE MARITIME BELGE 
171 923891 COMPAGNIE PLASTIC OMNIUM 
172 755165 COMPANHIA INDUSTRIAL DE RESINAS SINTETICAS, CIRES, S.A. 
173 892300 COMPANIA VINICOLA DEL NORTE DE ESPANA SA 
174 26496V COMPLETEL EUROPE NV 
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175 876246 COMPUGROUP HOLDING AG 
176 702134 CONAFEX HOLDINGS SA 
177 13760R CONERGY AG 
178 143726 CONSTANTIA PACKAGING AG 
179 273296 CONSTANTIN FILM AG 
180 749789 CONSTRUCCIONES Y AUXILIAR DE FERROCARRILES, S.A. 
181 929030 CONTINENTAL AG 
182 50781W CONTITECH AG 
183 685205 CORINTH PIPEWORKS SA 
184 31334W CORPORACION DERMOESTETICA 
185 772710 CORTICEIRA AMORIM, SOCIEDADE GESTORA DE PARTICIPACOES SOCIAIS, S.A. 
186 670595 CPL RESOURCES PLC 
187 142831 CRAMO OYJ 
188 911840 CRH PLC 
189 41221D CROPENERGIES AG 
190 701548 CROWN VAN GELDER NV 
191 269490 CRUCELL NV 
192 933025 CSM NV 
193 676629 CTAC NV 
194 284265 CTS EVENTIM AG 
195 932706 D'IETEREN S.A 
196 295059 D+S EUROPE AG 
197 688700 DAIMLER AG 
198 730973 DANIELI & C. OFFICINE MECCANICHE S.P.A. 
199 912833 DANONE 
200 936564 DASSAULT AVIATION 
201 866708 DASSAULT SYSTEMES SA 
202 268403 DATALEX PLC 
203 258614 DATALOGIC SPA 
204 259385 DAVIDE CAMPARI MILANO SPA 
205 135586 DCC PLC 
206 259437 DE LONGHI SPA 
207 702511 DECEUNINCK SA 
208 772311 DELACHAUX 
209 36133R DEMAG CRANES AG 
210 143409 DERICHEBOURG. 
211 929114 DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AG 
212 280598 DEUTSCHE POST AG 
213 882362 DEUTSCHE TELEKOM 
214 916181 DEUTZ AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
215 31174F DEVGEN NV 
216 25603E DIAGNOSTIC & THERAPEUTIC CENTER OF ATHENS 
217 50831K DIASORIN S.P.A. 
218 929028 DIDIER-WERKE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
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219 756886 DISTRIBORG GROUPE 
220 14910P DISTRIGAZ 
221 932876 DNC DE NEDERLANDEN COMPAGNIE NV 
222 892007 DOCDATA NV 
223 676805 DONEGAL CREAMERIES PLC 
224 930095 DOUGLAS HOLDING AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
225 697057 DPA FLEX GROUP N.V. 
226 998222 DRAEGERWERK AG 
227 974980 DRAGON OIL PLC 
228 307364 DRAKA HOLDING NV 
229 692689 DUCATI MOTOR HOLDINGS SPA 
230 775672 DUERR AG 
231 672624 DUVEL MOORTGAT NV 
232 929014 DYCKERHOFF AG 
233 916235 E.ON AG 
234 539731 EBRO PULEVA SA 
235 729463 ECONOCOM GROUP SA 
236 41383K EDF ENERGIES NOUVELLES SA 
237 772670 EDISON SPA 
238 885986 EDP - ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL S.A. 
239 936469 EIFFAGE 
240 951664 EISEN UND HUTTENWERKE 
241 974839 ELAN CORPORATION PLC 
242 779471 ELECNOR, S.A. 
243 32269V ELECTRICITE DE FRANCE 
244 929290 ELECTRICITE DE STRASBOURG SA 
245 31250R ELIA SYSTEM OPERATOR 
246 698783 ELISA OYJ 
247 142358 ELLAKTOR S.A. 
248 775188 ELRINGKLINGER AG 
249 25714E ENAGAS SA 
250 933063 ENBW ENERGIE BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG AG 
251 701720 ENDESA SA 
252 275791 ENEL SPA 
253 505918 ENERTAD 
254 255794 ENGINEERING INGEGNERIA INFORMATICA SPA 
255 866154 ENI - ENTE NAZIONALE IDROCARBURI 
256 50803P ENIA S.P.A. 
257 31281X ENTREPOSE CONTRACTING 
258 50788W ENVITEC BIOGAS AG 
259 275562 EPCOS AG 
260 143191 ERAMET 
261 929475 ERCROS, S.A. 
262 879965 ERG SPA 
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263 923871 ERIKS GROUP NV 
264 31915W ERSOL SOLAR ENERGY AG 
265 775055 ESCADA AG 
266 259444 ESPRINET SPA 
267 936514 ESSILOR INTERNATIONAL SOCIETE ANONYME 
268 929189 ESSO SOCIETE ANONYME FRANCAISE 
269 741782 ESTORIL - SOL, S.A. 
270 929349 ETABLISSEMENT DELHAIZE FRERES CIE LE LION SA 
271 505969 ETABLISSEMENTS MAUREL ET PROM 
272 885924 ETAM DEVELOPPEMENT 
273 892981 EUROFINS SCIENTIFIC 
274 41026Q EUROKAI KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFT AUF AKTIEN 
275 29848W EURONAV NV 
276 289361 EUROPEAN AERONAUTIC DEFENCE AND SPACE COMPANY EADS NV 
277 32057D EUTELSAT COMMUNICATIONS 
278 505096 EVN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
279 685755 EVS BROADCAST EQUIPMENT SA 
280 698444 EXACT HOLDING NV 
281 885915 EXEL INDUSTRIES 
282 741258 EXIDE TECHNOLOGIES, S.A. 
283 27189U EXMAR NV 
284 142523 EXXON MOBIL CHEMICAL 
285 275955 F-SECURE OYJ 
286 307660 F. REICHELT AG 
287 505632 FAES FARMA SA 
288 143061 FAIVELEY SA 
289 288944 FASTWEB SPA 
290 937211 FAURECIA 
291 50506D FERSA ENERGIAS RENOVABLES, S.A. 
292 729813 FIAT SPA 
293 143170 FIELMANN AG 
294 936644 FINANCIERE DE L'ODET SA 
295 936720 FINANCIERE MARC DE LACHARRIERE SOCIETE ANONYME 
296 772639 FINATIS 
297 936428 FINMECCANICA SPA 
298 505966 FINNAIR OYJ 
299 533130 FINNLINES OY 
300 50647K FIRST DERIVATIVES PLC 
301 759829 FISIPE-FIBRAS SINTETICAS DE PORTUGAL SA 
302 772948 FISKARS OYJ 
303 775058 FLEISCHEREI BEDARF AG 
304 307594 FLUGHAFEN WIEN AG 
305 51245F FLUIDRA SA 
306 866714 FLUXYS 
95 
307 307039 FNM S.P.A. 
308 890305 FOLLI-FOLLIE S.A. 
309 539877 FOMENTO DE CONSTRUCCIONES Y CONTRATAS SA 
310 682849 FONCIERE EUROPE LOGISTIQUE 
311 308444 FORNIX BIOSCIENCES 
312 690351 FORTUM OYJ 
313 772774 FOURLIS HOLDING SA 
314 885569 FRANCE TELECOM 
315 13922L FRAPORT AG 
316 278659 FREENET AG 
317 882294 FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE AG & CO. KGAA 
318 307694 FRESENIUS SE 
319 276536 FRIGOGLASS S.A. 
320 929228 FROMAGERIES BEL 
321 504299 FUCHS PETROLUB AG 
322 307521 FUGRO NV 
323 673963 FUTEBOL CLUB DO PORTO FUTEBOL SAD 
324 901432 FYFFES PLC 
325 30939T GALAPAGOS GENOMICS 
326 41289P GALP ENERGIA SGPS, S.A. 
327 269298 GAMESA CORPORACION TECNOLOGICA SA 
328 929306 GAMMA HOLDING NV 
329 929544 GAS NATURAL SDG, S.A. 
330 41456P GAS PLUS SPA 
331 936669 GAUMONT 
332 31270N GDF SUEZ 
333 929057 GEA GROUP AG 
334 308872 GEK GROUP OF COMPANIES S.A. 
335 929118 GELSENWASSER AG 
336 28985C GEMALTO N.V. 
337 912163 GEMINA - GENERALE MOBILIARE INTERESSENZE AZIONARIE S.P.A. 
338 36120C GENERAL DE ALQUILER DE MAQUINARIA S.A. 
339 259250 GENERALE DE SANTE SA 
340 29858J GEOX SPA 
341 50634F GERRESHEIMER AG 
342 881098 GERRY WEBER INTERNATIONAL AG 
343 29104U GESTEVISION TELECINCO SA 
344 505044 GEWISS SPA 
345 275497 GFK AG 
346 289005 GIFI 
347 929021 GILDEMEISTER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
348 692009 GL EVENTS 
349 692528 GL TRADE 
350 943979 GLANBIA PLC 
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351 672669 GLOBAL INTELLIGENT TECHNOLOGIES, SGPS, S.A 
352 685242 GORENJE GOSPODINJSKI APARATI DD 
353 745099 GOUDA VUURVAST HOLDING 
354 142602 GR. SARANTIS S.A. 
355 911868 GRAFTON GROUP PLC 
356 951473 GRAND MARNIER 
357 259218 GRANITIFIANDRE SPA 
358 928730 GREENCORE GROUP PLC 
359 290300 GRENKELEASING AG 
360 29238T GRIFOLS SA 
361 998414 GRONTMIJ NV 
362 50767F GROUPE EUROTUNNEL S.A. 
363 143656 GROUPE PARTOUCHE SA 
364 672558 GROUPE STERIA 
365 950640 GRUPO DURO-FELGUERA, S.A. 
366 772509 GRUPO EMPRESARIAL ENCE SA 
367 692810 GRUPO FERROVIAL, S.A. 
368 28769N GRUPO MEDIA CAPITAL SGPS S.A 
369 672670 GRUPPO COIN SPA 
370 779427 GRUPPO EDITORIALE L'ESPRESSO SPA 
371 50629T GRUPPO ZIGNAGO VETRO S.P.A 
372 32357R GUALA CLOSURES GROUP 
373 741849 GUERBET 
374 916750 GUYENNE ET GASCOGNE SA 
375 951778 H&R WASAG AG 
376 885357 HALOGEN HOLDINGS SA 
377 51234R HAMBURGER HAFEN UND LOGISTIK AG 
378 892030 HAMON & CIE (INTERNATIONAL) SA 
379 692039 HAULOTTE GROUP 
380 936677 HAVAS SA 
381 929015 HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG 
382 671294 HEIDELBERGER DRUCKMASCHINEN AG 
383 309341 HEIJMANS NV 
384 929708 HEINEKEN HOLDING 
385 905001 HEINEKEN NV 
386 673454 HELLENIC DUTY FREE SHOPS SA 
387 681817 HELLENIC PETROLEUM S.A. 
388 866513 HELLENIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS ORGANISATION S.A. 
389 702812 HENKEL KGAA 
390 27202M HERA SPA 
391 777331 HERACLES GENERAL CEMENT COMPANY S.A. 
392 309037 HERMES INTERNATIONAL SCA 
393 929956 HES BEHEER NV 
394 698014 HIGHLIGHT COMMUNICATIONS AG 
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395 681292 HITT N.V. 
396 929018 HOCHTIEF AG VORM. GEBR. HELFMANN 
397 951190 HOLCIM (DEUTSCHLAND) AG 
398 504918 HOLLAND COLOURS NV 
399 14048T HOMAG GROUP AG 
400 755415 HORNBACH HOLDING AG 
401 309869 HORNBACH-BAUMARKT-AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
402 504458 HUGO BOSS AG 
403 772286 HUHTAMAKI OYJ 
404 933240 HUNTER DOUGLAS NV 
405 775787 HYMER AG 
406 289086 IASO SA 
407 953204 IAWS GROUP PLC 
408 51390L IBERDROLA RENOVABLES S.A 
409 998213 IBERDROLA S.A. 
410 258615 IBERIA, LINEAS AEREAS DE ESPANA, S.A. 
411 892901 IBERPAPEL GESTION SA 
412 890859 IBERSOL SGPS SA 
413 698243 ICON PLC 
414 897830 ICT AUTOMATISERING N.V. 
415 698008 IDS SCHEER AG 
416 28400H ILIAD SA 
417 912049 IMERYS SA 
418 285540 IMMSI SPA 
419 777307 IMOBILIARIA CONSTRUTORA GRAO - PARA, SA 
420 951104 IMPREGILO SPA 
421 289223 IMPRESA SGPS SA 
422 755190 IMS - INTERNATIONAL METAL SERVICE SA 
423 916108 IMTECH NV 
424 289504 INBEV SA 
425 911819 INDEPENDENT NEWS & MEDIA PLC 
426 755149 INDESIT COMPANY SPA 
427 13863H INDITEX 
428 749799 INDRA SISTEMAS 
429 301573 INDUS HOLDING AG 
430 143729 INDUSTRIA MACCHINE AUTOMATICHE SPA 
431 287489 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG 
432 921366 INGENICO - COMPAGNIE INDUSTRIELLE ET FINANCIERE D'INGENIERIE 
433 679334 INNOCONCEPTS N.V. 
434 26624K INNOGENETICS NV 
435 142572 INTER PARFUMS 
436 30402X INTERCELL AG 
437 682020 INTEREUROPA INC 
438 885153 INTERPUMP GROUP SPA 
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439 681309 INTERSEROH AG 
440 276388 INTRALOT S.A. - INTEGRATED LOTTERY SYSTEMS & SERVICES 
441 756625 INVESTIMENTOS, PARTICIPACOES E GESTAO, S.A. 
442 685499 INYPSA INFORMES Y PROYECTOS S.A. 
443 682862 ION BEAM APPLICATIONS SA 
444 892609 IONA TECHNOLOGIES PLC 
445 32376D IPSEN 
446 672675 IPSOS SA 
447 255231 IRIDE SPA 
448 136519 IRISH CONTINENTAL GROUP PLC 
449 682022 ISTRABENZ DD 
450 702055 ITALCEMENTI SPA 
451 779032 ITALMOBILIARE SPA 
452 885474 ITI - INTERNATIONAL TRADING & INVESTMENTS 
453 772809 ITINERE INFRAESTRUCTURAS SA 
454 756167 JABELMALUX SA 
455 259244 JC DECAUX SA 
456 681441 JENOPTIK AG 
457 504692 JERONIMO MARTINS SGPS SA 
458 278304 JETIX EUROPE NV 
459 775099 JOHN DEERE-LANZ VERWALTUNGS-AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
460 885996 JUMBO SA 
461 505973 JUNGHEINRICH AG 
462 929035 K+S AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
463 741618 KAP-BETEILIGUNG AG 
464 50696N KAPSCH TRAFFICCOM AG 
465 276765 KAUFMAN & BROAD SA 
466 143267 KEMIRA OYJ 
467 932895 KENDRION NV 
468 991530 KENMARE RESOURCES PLC 
469 921260 KERAMAG-KERAMISCHE WERKE AG 
470 901049 KERRY GROUP PLC 
471 698494 KESKO OYJ 
472 673493 KINEPOLIS GROUP 
473 953547 KINGSPAN GROUP PLC 
474 284267 KIZOO AG 
475 36133K KLOECKNER & CO. AG 
476 929098 KLOECKNER-WERKE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
477 992562 KOENIG & BAUER AG 
478 772959 KONE OYJ 
479 866457 KONECRANES OYJ 
480 916642 KONINKLIJKE AHOLD NV 
481 932775 KONINKLIJKE BAM GROEP NV 
482 899432 KONINKLIJKE BRILL N.V 
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483 779426 KONINKLIJKE DSM N.V. 
484 142440 KONINKLIJKE KPN NV 
485 933031 KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS N.V. 
486 930119 KONINKLIJKE TEN CATE NV 
487 278066 KONINKLIJKE VOPAK NV 
488 308977 KONINKLIJKE WESSANEN NV 
489 290657 KONTRON AG 
490 41383J KORIAN 
491 682027 KRKA DD NOVO MESTO 
492 686872 KRONES AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT HERMANN KRONSEDER MASCHINENFABRIK 
493 929060 KSB AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
494 28221H KTM POWER SPORTS AG 
495 929024 KUKA AG 
496 921289 KWS SAAT AG 
497 923386 L'OREAL 
498 866097 L.D.C. SOCIETE ANONYME 
499 929622 LA SEDA DE BARCELONA, S.A. 
500 50804V LABORATORIOS ALMIRALL SA 
501 51375N LABORATORIOS FARMACEUTICOS ROVI S.A. 
502 916745 LAFARGE S.A. 
503 998500 LAGARDERE S.C.A. 
504 777334 LAMPSAS GREEK HOTEL CO. SA 
505 50703P LANDI RENZO S.P.A. 
506 30169F LANXESS AG 
507 772961 LASSILA & TIKANOJA OY 
508 672582 LAURENT PERRIER 
509 929125 LECHWERKE AG 
510 35612E LEGRAND S.A. 
511 533160 LEMMINKAINEN OY 
512 702589 LENZING AG 
513 944429 LEONI AG 
514 412647 LHS AG 
515 923551 LINDE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
516 143524 LISGRAFICA - IMPRESSAO DE ARTES GRAFICAS 
517 504524 LISI 
518 13871C LOTTOMATICA S.P.A. 
519 505325 LOTUS BAKERIES NV 
520 682032 LUKA KOPER, D.D. 
521 997842 LUNDIN INTERNATIONAL 
522 255249 LUXOTTICA GROUP 
523 916658 LVMH MOET HENNESSY LOUIS VUITTON 
524 772967 M-REAL OYJ 
525 143198 M6 - METROPOLE TELEVISION SA 
526 932850 MACINTOSH RETAIL GROUP 
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527 51337W MAIRE TECNIMONT SPA 
528 929560 MAN AG 
529 772644 MANITOU BF S.A. 
530 702598 MANUTAN INTERNATIONAL SA 
531 41221V MANZ AUTOMATION AG 
532 298539 MARIELLA BURANI SPA 
533 31250P MARR SPA 
534 50760V MARTIFER SGPS, S.A. 
535 142344 MAYR-MELNHOF KARTON AG 
536 926349 MCINERNEY HOLDINGS PLC 
537 692849 MECALUX SA 
538 866990 MEDIASET 
539 695480 MEDION AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
540 143049 MEDITERRANEA DELLE ACQUE SPA 
541 31988K MEETIC 
542 50478N MEINL AIRPORTS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 
543 25544L MELEXIS NV 
544 41412F MEMBER COMPANY (THE) (TMC) N.V. 
545 13759Q MERCATOR POSLOVNI SISTEM 
546 301774 MERCK KGAA 
547 13759U MERKUR KRANJ 
548 982585 METKA S.A. 
549 882059 METRO AG 
550 505967 METSO OYJ 
551 885055 MIQUEL Y COSTAS & MIQUEL SA 
552 672614 MITISKA 
553 685686 MOBISTAR SA 
554 695615 MORPHOSYS AG 
555 866032 MOTA-ENGIL SGPS SA 
556 259467 MOTOR OIL SA 
557 31131W MTU AERO ENGINES HOLDING AG 
558 695482 MVV ENERGIE AG 
559 362541 MYTILINEOS HOLDINGS S.A. 
560 932859 N.V. NEDERLANDSCHE APPARATENFABRIEK 'NEDAP' 
561 531874 NATRA SA 
562 26577L NATRACEUTICAL SA 
563 933085 NAVIGAZIONE MONTANARI SPA 
564 916698 NEDFIELD 
565 27028Q NEOCHIMIKI LV LAVRENTIADIS SA 
566 692552 NEOPOST S.A. 
567 30754M NESTE OIL OYJ 
568 741467 NEWAYS ELECTRONICS INTERNATIONAL 
569 32302C NEWCOURT GROUP PLC 
570 259181 NEXANS SA 
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571 31976M NEXTRADIOTV 
572 997952 NH HOTELES SA 
573 35968L NICE SPA 
574 504444 NICOLAS CORREA S.A. 
575 276432 NICOX SA 
576 729882 NOKIA CORPORATION 
577 143730 NOKIAN RENKAAT OY 
578 142650 NORBERT DENTRESSANGLE 
579 681983 NORDDEUTSCHE AFFINERIE AG 
580 13703L NORDEX AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
581 36183C NORKOM GROUP PLC 
582 289402 NOVABASE SGPS SA 
583 289270 NRJ GROUPE 
584 897320 NUTRECO HOLDING NV 
585 896676 NYLOPLAST NV 
586 51218T NYRSTAR NV 
587 289380 OBERTHUR TECHNOLOGIES 
588 505540 OBRASCON HUARTE LAIN SA 
589 922887 OCE NV 
590 41249J OCTOPLUS 
591 779332 OESTERREICHISCHE ELEKTRIZITATSWIRTSCHAFTS AG (VERBUNDGESELLSCHAFT) 
592 681806 OMEGA PHARMA NV 
593 756879 OMV AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
594 259035 OPAP S.A. 
595 308273 OPG GROEP NV 
596 27399U OPTION NV 
597 923433 ORANJEWOUD NV 
598 741609 ORDINA NV 
599 308504 ORION CORPORATION 
600 15406Q ORPEA SA 
601 36062H OSTERREICHISCHE POST AG 
602 505135 OUTOKUMPU OYJ 
603 41266N OUTOTEC OYJ 
604 255282 PADDY POWER PLC 
605 29170F PAGESJAUNES 
606 672520 PALFINGER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
607 779368 PAPELARIA FERNANDES-INDUS. E COMERCIO,SA 
608 685054 PAPELES Y CARTONES DE EUROPA SA 
609 31974N PARMALAT SPA 
610 952284 PAUL HARTMANN AG 
611 672735 PERMASTEELISA GROUP SPA 
612 923539 PERNOD RICARD 
613 308649 PESCANOVA, S.A. 
614 41026D PETROCELTIC INTERNATIONAL PLC 
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615 682040 PETROL LJUBLJANA 
616 912709 PEUGEOT S.A. 
617 679205 PFEIFFER VACUUM TECHNOLOGY AG 
618 951678 PFLEIDERER AG 
619 698852 PHARMING GROUP NV 
620 29955U PHOENIX SOLAR AG 
621 36232W PIAGGIO NC SPA 
622 672583 PIERRE ET VACANCES 
623 929016 PILKINGTON DEUTSCHLAND AG 
624 672653 PINGUIN NV 
625 27348D PIRAEUS PORT AUTH 
626 933333 PIRELLI & C SPA 
627 13760V PIVOVARNA LASKO DD 
628 866421 PLACOPLATRE LAMBERT 
629 35744M POLYTEC HOLDING AG 
630 876263 PONSSE OYJ 
631 946281 PORSCHE AUTOMOBIL HOLDING SE 
632 152477 PORTUCEL - EMPRESA PRODUTORA DE PASTA E PAPEL SA 
633 152311 PORTUGAL TELECOM SGPS SA 
634 28541U POWEO SA 
635 898791 POYRY OYJ 
636 923657 PPR SA 
637 32320H PRAKTIKER BAU- UND HEIMWERKERMARKTE HOLDING AG 
638 30409V PREMIERE AG 
639 504675 PRIM, S.A. 
640 289300 PROMOTORA DE INFORMACIONES S.A. (PRISA) 
641 772773 PROSEGUR, COMPANIA DE SEGURIDAD, S.A. 
642 897801 PROSIEBENSAT.1 MEDIA AG 
643 892788 PROVIDENCE RESOURCES PLC 
644 259364 PROVIMI SA 
645 50483U PRYSMIAN SPA 
646 14861Q PUBLIC POWER CORPORATION SA 
647 936775 PUBLICIS GROUPE SA 
648 14453H PULEVA BIOTECH SA 
649 729717 PUMA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT RUDOLF DASSLER SPORT 
650 897915 PUNCH GRAPHIX NV 
651 692657 PUNCH INTERNATIONAL 
652 31915V Q-CELLS AG 
653 882416 QIAGEN N.V. 
654 290665 QSC AG 
655 320334 QUILMES INDUSTRIAL SA 
656 690103 QURIUS N.V. 
657 729209 RALLYE 
658 679421 RAMIRENT OYJ 
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659 505482 RANDSTAD HOLDING NV 
660 287943 RATIONAL AG 
661 504843 RAUTARUUKKI OYJ 
662 926522 READYMIX PLC 
663 885888 REAL SOFTWARE GROUP NV 
664 923325 RECORDATI SPA 
665 923969 RECTICEL 
666 672716 RED ELECTRICA DE ESPANA, S.A. 
667 308471 REDITUS-GESTORA PARTICIPACOES SOCIAIS SA 
668 307428 REMY COINTREAU 
669 50776X REN - REDES ENERGETICAS NACIONAIS, SGPS, S.A. 
670 143366 RENAULT (REGIE NATIONALE DES USINES) SA 
671 952299 RENK AG 
672 15314M REPOWER SYSTEMS AG 
673 504421 REPSOL-YPF SA 
674 50367K REXEL S.A. 
675 929129 RHEINMETALL AG 
676 756422 RHI AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
677 682867 RHODIA 
678 307055 RHOEN-KLINIKUM AG 
679 885552 RIZZOLI CORRIERE DELLA SERA MEDIAGROUP SPA 
680 741499 ROOD TESTHOUSE INTERNATIONAL NV 
681 540017 ROSIER SA 
682 35923C ROTH & RAU AG 
683 692036 ROULARTA MEDIA GROUP NV 
684 922358 ROYAL BOSKALIS WESTMINSTER NV 
685 923857 ROYALREESINK N.V. 
686 932783 RSDB N.V. 
687 143381 RTL GROUP 
688 929242 RUBIS 
689 902191 RWE AG 
690 897365 RYANAIR HOLDINGS PLC 
691 912622 SACYR VALLEHERMOSO 
692 142963 SAES GETTERS SPA 
693 32506N SAFILO GROUP 
694 929273 SAFRAN 
695 31281W SAFT GROUPE S.A. 
696 685082 SAG GEST - SOLUCOES AUTOMOVEL GLOBAIS, SGPS, SA 
697 929298 SAGA 
698 741689 SAINT GOBAIN 
699 729304 SAINT-GOBAIN OBERLAND AG 
700 906090 SAIPEM SPA 
701 929099 SALZGITTER AG 
702 997702 SAMAS-GROEP NV 
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703 992594 SANOFI-AVENTIS 
704 775543 SAP AG - SYSTEME ANWENDUNGEN PRODUKTE IN DER DATENVERARBEITUNG 
705 932565 SAPEC SOCIETE ANONYME 
706 35918T SARAS RAFFINERIE SARDE SPA 
707 682050 SAVA DD 
708 916775 SBM OFFSHORE NV 
709 929541 SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AG 
710 998075 SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC SA 
711 885985 SCHOELLER-BLECKMANN OILFIELD EQUIP. AG 
712 923065 SCHUITEMA N.V. 
713 143787 SCHWARZ PHARMA AG 
714 27337K SEAT PAGINE GIALLE SPA 
715 936411 SEB S.A. 
716 890413 SECHE ENVIRONNEMENT 
717 540162 SECHILIENNE-SIDEC 
718 41405J SELOGER.COM 
719 152499 SEMAPA - SOCIEDADE DE INVESTIMENTO E GESTAO SGPS, S.A. 
720 929039 SEMPERIT AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT HOLDING 
721 885336 SEO-STE ELECTRIQUE DE L'OUR SA 
722 673898 SEQUANA 
723 749819 SERVICE POINT SOLUTIONS SA 
724 685030 SES S.A. 
725 143641 SGL CARBON AG 
726 15188U SIAS 
727 143463 SIDENOR SA 
728 902192 SIEMENS AG 
729 729499 SIMAC TECHNIEK NV 
730 898719 SINGULUS TECHNOLOGIES AG 
731 881905 SIOEN INDUSTRIES 
732 932404 SIPEF SOCIETE ANONYME 
733 413547 SITESERV PLC 
734 775697 SIXT AG 
735 504959 SLIGRO FOOD GROUP NV 
736 53614P SMA SOLAR TECHNOLOGY AG 
737 362709 SMARTRAC NV 
738 950807 SMIT INTERNATIONALE NV 
739 50259L SMURFIT KAPPA GROUP PLC 
740 936417 SNAI SPA 
741 14822X SNAM RETE GAS SPA 
742 881457 SNCF PARTICIPATIONS 
743 929482 SNIACE SA 
744 755787 SOARES DA COSTA SGPS SA 
745 998392 SOCFINAL - STE FINANCIERE LUXEMBOURGEOISE SA 
746 997606 SOCFINASIA SA 
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747 929535 SOCIEDAD GENERAL DE AGUAS DE BARCELONA, S.A. 
748 759833 SOCIEDADE COMERCIAL OREY ANTUNES SA 
749 930885 SOCIETE BIC 
750 932654 SOCIETE COMMERCIALE DE BRASSERIE 'CO. BR. HA.' 
751 776488 SOCIETE DES BAINS DE MER ET DU CERCLE DES ETRANGERS A MONACO 
752 539941 SOCIETE FERMIERE DU CASINO MUNICIPAL DE CANNES 
753 936699 SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE DE PLANTATIONS D'HEVEAS 
754 776576 SOCIETE SUCRIERE DE PITHIVIERS LE VIEIL 
755 993597 SODEXO 
756 697269 SOFTWARE AG 
757 779062 SOGEFI SPA 
758 692515 SOITEC 
759 866797 SOL MELIA S.A. 
760 685000 SOL SPA 
761 31446E SOLAR MILLENNIUM AG 
762 50678L SOLARIA ENERGIA Y MEDIO AMBIENTE, S.A. 
763 278333 SOLARWORLD AG 
764 688751 SOLON AG FUER SOLARTECHNIK 
765 945992 SOLVAC 
766 912543 SOLVAY SOCIETE ANONYME 
767 982099 SOMFY SA 
768 51504P SONAE CAPITAL, SGPS, S.A. 
769 729744 SONAE INDUSTRIA, SOCIEDADE GESTORA DE PARTICIPACOES SOCIAIS, SA 
770 741812 SONAE-SGSP SA 
771 289230 SONAECOM SGPS S.A. 
772 505319 SOPRA GROUP 
773 28283X SORIN SPA 
774 682937 SOS CUETARA SA 
775 932652 SPADEL SA 
776 741723 SPERIAN PROTECTION 
777 504853 SPIR COMMUNICATION 
778 673964 SPORTING SOCIEDADE DESPORT DE FUTEBOL SAD 
779 29027R SPYKER CARS N.V. 
780 676138 STADA ARZNEIMITTEL AG 
781 685132 STALLERGENES 
782 866148 STE DES BRASSERIES DE L'OUEST AFRICAIN 
783 143238 STEDIM 
784 681804 STEF-TFE 
785 932773 STERN GROEP NV 
786 936326 STINAG STUTTGART INVEST AG. 
787 143375 STMICROELECTRONICS NV 
788 932700 STOCKMANN OYJ ABP 
789 755028 STORA ENSO OYJ 
790 929083 STRABAG BETEILIGUNGS AG 
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791 51200L STRABAG SE 
792 775158 SUDWESTDEUTSCHE SALZWERKE AG 
793 936915 SUED-CHEMIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
794 929100 SUEDZUCKER AG 
795 53595N SUEZ ENVIRONNEMENT COMPANY 
796 504845 SUMOLIS CIA. IND. DE FRUTAS E BEBIDAS SA 
797 745052 SUPER DE BOER 
798 275512 SURTECO SE 
799 41442V SYMRISE AG 
800 936933 SYNERGIE SA 
801 273293 TAKKT AG 
802 504527 TAVEX ALGODONERA, S.A. 
803 275577 TECHEM AG & CO 
804 143241 TECHNIP 
805 36159L TECNICAS REUNIDAS S.A. 
806 749111 TECNOCOM TEL Y ENE SA 
807 685840 TEIXEIRA DUARTE - ENGENHARIA E CONSTRUCOES SA 
808 885184 TELECOM ITALIA MEDIA 
809 27337N TELECOM ITALIA SPA 
810 929534 TELEFONICA SA 
811 697528 TELEGATE AG 
812 921048 TELEGRAAF MEDIA GROEP 
813 289469 TELEKOM AUSTRIA AG 
814 41251Q TELEKOM SLOVENIJE DD 
815 32011D TELENET GROUP HOLDING NV 
816 936782 TELEPERFORMANCE 
817 26613D TENARIS S.A. 
818 51278E TERNA ENERGY SA 
819 29096C TERNA SPA 
820 916015 TESSENDERLO CHEMIE S.A. 
821 755793 TF1 - TV FRANCAISE 
822 923543 THALES SA 
823 26033U THEOLIA 
824 276479 THOMSON 
825 36232R THROMBOGENICS NV 
826 929097 THYSSENKRUPP AG 
827 719741 TIETOENATOR OYJ 
828 275610 TISCALI SPA 
829 755486 TITAN CEMENT COMPANY S.A. 
830 932903 TKH GROUP N.V. 
831 681714 TNT NV 
832 269965 TOD'S SPA 
833 50698Q TOGNUM AG 
834 31102D TOMTOM N.V. 
107 
835 932482 TOTAL GABON SA 
836 41368F TOTAL PRODUCE 
837 912398 TOTAL SA 
838 500414 TOYOTA CAETANO PORTUGAL SA 
839 673306 TRANSGENE 
840 672738 TREVI FINANZIARIA INDUSTRIALE 
841 673286 TRIGANO 
842 504383 TUBACEX SA 
843 26530D TUBOS REUNIDOS SA 
844 929059 TUI AG 
845 866709 UBISOFT ENTERTAINMENT SA 
846 916676 UCB SA 
847 929345 UMICORE SA 
848 933282 UNI LAND SPA 
849 936591 UNIBEL 
850 932414 UNIBRA SA 
851 905478 UNILEVER N.V. 
852 929540 UNION FENOSA SA 
853 779452 UNIPAPEL SA 
854 676348 UNIT 4 AGRESSO NV 
855 953818 UNITED DRUG PLC 
856 676648 UNITED INTERNET AG 
857 539717 UPM-KYMMENE OYJ 
858 533136 UPONOR OYJ 
859 932820 USG PEOPLE N.V. 
860 276631 UTOPIA 
861 255977 VACON OYJ 
862 533192 VAISALA OYJ 
863 922053 VALEO SA 
864 892877 VAN DE VELDE SA 
865 31989M VELCAN ENERGY 
866 289374 VEOLIA ENVIRONNEMENT 
867 50420T VERSATEL AG 
868 50940H VERTICE TRESCIENTOS SESENTA GRADOS S.A. 
869 41357X VETOQUINOL SA 
870 741715 VIANINI LAVORI S.P.A. 
871 997836 VICAT SA 
872 776436 VIDRALA SA 
873 876262 VIKING LINE ABP 
874 309810 VILMORIN & CIE 
875 772568 VINCI 
876 500341 VIOHALCO HELLENIC COPPER & ALUM IND. SA 
877 772692 VIRBAC 
878 749099 VISCOFAN SA 
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879 539567 VIVARTIA S.A. 
880 923139 VIVENDI 
881 413931 VOCENTO SA 
882 303482 VOEST-ALPINE AG 
883 741053 VOLKSWAGEN AG 
884 505509 VOSSLOH AG 
885 692782 VPK PACKAGING GROUP NV 
886 673494 VRANKEN - POMMERY MONOPOLE 
887 50704T VTG AG 
888 414438 VUELING AIRLINES, SA 
889 35649C WACKER CHEMIE AG 
890 50507P WACKER CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT AG 
891 772963 WARTSILA OYJ 
892 41271K WAVIN N.V. 
893 998096 WIENERBERGER AG 
894 28990K WINCOR NIXDORF AG 
895 268562 WIRECARD AG 
896 929056 WMF WURTTEMBERGISCHE METALLWARENFABRIK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
897 932826 WOLTERS KLUWER NV 
898 142836 YIT OYJ 
899 745012 ZARDOYA OTIS SA 
900 775185 ZEAG ENERGIE AG 
901 890502 ZELTIA SA 
902 50760Q ZHONGDE WASTE TECHNOLOGY AG. 
903 993501 ZODIAC SA 
904 276529 ZON MULTIMEDIA - SERVICOS DE TELECOMUNICACOES E MULTIMEDIA, SGPS, S.A., 
905 685680 ZUMTOBEL AG 
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10/2000 – 03/2009 University of Vienna 
 Master in International Business Administration 
(Mag. rer. soc. oec.) with specialization in Corporate 
Finance (Prof. Josef Zechner) and Management 
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Abstract in English 
 
Trade credit financing can entail several advantages such as 
stimulating sales and investments and the possibility to reduce information 
asymmetries. However, it also involves some risks and costs caused by 
financial distress and default. The literature shows that trade credit provides 
relatively more financing when alternative sources like bank credit are 
exhausted. Previous research by Preve (2004) shows for the US that 
financially distressed firms use relatively more trade credit than their 
undistressed counterparts. This paper, which makes use of panel data of 
European Monetary Union firms over a period of eleven years, partially 
supports this finding. It shows that financially distressed European 
Monetary Union firms substitute equity with trade credit but surprisingly 
reduce trade credit compared to long term debt. Further, the results suggest 
that large and small firms use more trade credit during financial distress but 
there is no clear tendency whether smaller firms use more than larger ones. 
However, due to the low explanatory power and partly ambiguous or 
conflicting results the models of Preve (2004) for the US do not apply well 
for the European Monetary Union. An interpretation is that the financing 
behavior of US and European firms is different and that creditor protection 
and accounting standards are not the same. 
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Abstract in German  
 
Die betriebliche Finanzierung mittels Handelskredit bringt 
mehrere Vorteile mit sich. Zum Beispiel können auf der Verkäuferseite 
Umsätze stimuliert werden und auf der Käuferseite notwendige 
Finanzierungen leichter getätigt werden, besonders dann wenn andere 
Finanzierungsquellen wie Bankkredite erschöpft sind. Die 
Handelskreditfinanzierung kann weiters Informationsasymmetrien 
zwischen Handelskreditnehmer und -geber reduzieren, weil Käufer und 
Verkäufer meist häufiger in Geschäftskontakt treten als Banken mit 
Kreditnehmern. Handelskreditgeber kennen oft das Gewerbe besser und 
können somit speziell mittels Soft-Facts die Geschäftslage und 
Kreditwürdigkeit ihrer Geschäftspartner bzw. Handelskreditnehmer 
besser als Banken einschätzen. 
Die Handelskreditfinanzierung birgt natürlich aber auch Risiken 
und Kosten für den Handelskreditgeber. Zum Beispiel aus 
Zahlungsverzögerungen und Totalausfällen bei Konkurs eines 
Schuldners, speziell wenn das gelieferte Gut bereits weiterverarbeitet 
wurde oder verderblich ist. Die Literatur zeigt dass Firmen mehr 
Handelskredit verwenden wenn alternative Finanzierungsquellen versiegt 
sind. Empirische Untersuchungen von Preve (2004) zeigen weiters dass 
amerikanische Unternehmen mit finanziellen „Problemen“ (financial 
distress) relativ mehr Handelskredit verwenden. Diese Erkenntnis wird 
durch die vorliegende Arbeit mittels empirischer Untersuchung eines 
Panels von 11 Jahren von Firmen der Europäischen Währungsunion 
belegt. 
Weiters werden in dieser Arbeit der Substitutionseffekt und die 
Bedeutung der Firmengröße auf den Handelskreditgebrauch bei 
finanziellen Problemen getestet. Die Resultate zeigen, dass europäische 
Firmen mit finanziellen Problemen dazu tendieren Eigenkapital mit 
Handelskredit zu substituieren, was die Erkenntnisse von Preve (2004) 
bestätigt. Die vorliegende Arbeit kann jedoch nicht die Substituierung 
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von Finanzschulden untermauern. Dies kann damit begründet werden, 
dass Modelle von Preve (2004) verwendet werden. Folglich passen diese 
nicht gut für Firmen der Europäischen Währungsunion, wie gezeigt 
durch die Regressionen dieser Arbeit, welche sehr niedrige 
Bestimmtheitsmaße aufweisen. Eine alternative Interpretation des 
Resultats ist, dass Europäische Banken Europäische Firmen trotz 
„financial distress“ mit mehr Bankkredit versorgen. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen weiters, dass relativ große und kleine 
Firmen mehr Handelskredit verwenden, wenn sie finanzielle Probleme 
haben. Im Gegensatz zu Preve (2004) zeigen die Resultate jedoch keine 
klare Tendenz ob große oder kleine Firmen mehr Handelskredit 
verwenden. Generell sind die Erkenntnisse dieser Arbeit aber nicht nur 
aufgrund geringer R
2‟s, sondern auch durch die teilweise zweideutigen 
Ergebnisse bzw. einzelne nicht signifikante Koeffizienten je nach dem 
welche „Cluster-“ und „absorbing“ Spezifikationen verwendet werden, 
mit Vorsicht zu genießen. Ein Grund warum die Ergebnisse teilweise 
widersprüchlich sind, ist die Verwendung von „US-Modellen“, die 
offenbar nicht gut für Firmen der Europäischen Währungsunion geeignet 
sind. Folglich ist das Resultat, dass in der EWU im Vergleich zu den 
USA deutlich mehr Handelskredit verwendet wird entweder zufällig 
passiert oder durch andere hier nicht betrachtete Faktoren verursacht 
worden. Weitere Deutungen der vorliegenden Ergebnisse sind dass das 
Finanzierungsverhalten von US und EWU Firmen unterschiedlich ist, 
dass es Unterschiede im Kreditorenschutz gibt und dass die Ergebnisse 
auf unterschiedliche Finanzierungsverhalten aber auch eventuell 
unterschiedliche Bilanzierungsstandards zurückzuführen sind. Als 
Implikation sind Modelle nicht auf alle Länder bzw. Finanzsysteme 
anwendbar. 
 
 
